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Abstract
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good
over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either
be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy,
defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In each period, a legislature
with representatives of each of n districts bargain over the current period’s endowment
for investment in the public good and transfers to each district. We analyze the Markov
perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes
required for passage. We show that the efficiency of the public policy is increasing in
q because higher q leads to higher investment in the public good and less pork. We
examine the theoretical equilibrium predictions by conducting a laboratory experimen
with five-person committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity
(q=5); majority (q=3); and dictatorship (q=1).
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1 Introduction
A central role of government is the provision of public goods to its citizenry. Most public
goods provided by governments are durable, and hence dynamic in nature. It takes time to
accumulate them, and they depreciate slowly, projecting benefits for many years. Prominent
examples are national defense, environmental protection and public infrastructure. Although
a large literature has studied public good provision and public policy formation by govern-
ments or legislatures in static models, both theoretically and empirically, much less is known
about dynamics of public investments. Two political economy questions immediately come
to mind. First, can we say anything about the efficiency of dynamic public investment by
legislatures or governing bodies operating under democratic rules? Second, to what extent
does the efficiency depend on the specific voting rules under which these governing bodies
operate? Again, little is known about these effects, except for highly specialized static en-
vironments, where only a single decision is taken (for example, Baron and Ferejohn [1989],
Volden and Wiseman [2005]).
In this work, we make a first attempt to answer such questions by proposing a new
theoretical framework for studying the political economy of dynamic public good provision.
We analyze a legislative bargaining model under alternative voting rules and examine its
predictions in a laboratory experiment. The basic environment we study consists of many
citizens who live in n equal-sized districts and can invest resources over time to accumulate
a stock of durable public good (roads, bridges, sewers, etc.). An investment policy is taken
each period by a central governing body, the Legislature, composed of a single representative
from each district, and operating under a procedure consisting of an agenda setting stage
and a voting rule. In each period, the legislature has the power to allocate a fixed budget
of resources between investment in the public good (whose utility is enjoyed by all citizens
of all districts) and targeted transfers between districts.1 Representatives bargain in the
legislature over the budget allocation. We characterize the trajectory of public policies that
would result from a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for any q rule adopted by the
legislature, where a q rule requires q out of n yes votes for passage of policy for the current
period. We compare these equilibrium trajectories with the optimal public policy (i.e. the
policy that maximizes the welfare of the citizens).
The equilibrium generates clear predictions about how the dynamics of investment are
affected by the voting rule the legislature uses to make its decisions. The model implies that
a stricter requirement for passage (i.e., higher q) will generate a higher level of investment
1That is, in each period, public policy actually has three components: public investment, taxation, and
redistribution.
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and a higher steady state of the public good. For any voting rule, investment should continue
until a steady state is reached, and the equilibrium steady states are monotonically increasing
in q. For any q rule except unanimity, this steady state is lower than in the optimal solution.
Furthermore, for any voting rule including unanimity, the speed of investment along the
transition path to the steady state is slower than in the optimal solution, as proposers with
agenda control have an incentive to skim off resources along the way.
We examine the predictions of the theory by conducting a carefully designed series of
controlled laboratory experiments. In the experiments, we focus on three alternative voting
rules: a dictatorship rule (D), a simple majority rule (M), and a unanimity rule (U). There
are several reasons for examining the theory with data from controlled experiments. First,
some kind of data is needed to discipline the theory. It is important to identify whether
the theory is at all reasonable from a behavioral or empirical standpoint. Second, if one is
going to take the model to data, there are clear identification advantages for experimental
studies when studying a highly structured dynamic environment such as the one in this
paper. In our model, strategic behavior can be clearly identified only if there is a precise
measurement of certain state variables as well as the actions available to the players, and
for this purpose data from laboratory experiments that control key variables in observable
ways have some obvious advantages over field data. The control of laboratory experiments
allows us to directly test the main comparative static implication of the theory: Do higher
q rules lead to more efficient investment paths?
A third motivation for pursuing the experiments is that the predictions and assumptions
of the model seem unintuitive and in many ways implausible. The legislators in the model
are assumed to be completely rational and selfish, with rational expectations and perfect
foresight about the entire infinite equilibrium path of public policies. Any behavioral lim-
itations, bounded rationality, or other-regarding preferences are completely assumed away,
and in principle the presence of these factors could drastically change the predictions of the
model. Thus, because there is considerable evidence from both controlled experiments and
casual observation that people are neither perfectly rational, purely selfish, nor perfectly
clairvoyant, there is good reason to be skeptical of the predictions that come out of such a
model. This leads to the second basic question we ask: Are the predictions of the model
robust to behavioral factors and limitations on perfect rationality that we know exist but
are assumed away in the model?
Finally, it is important to note that our model’s predictions only apply to a very small
subset of the huge set of subgame perfect equilibria in the infinite game. In particular, there
generally exist non-Markov equilibria that lead to efficient investment paths independently
of the q rule. Such equilibria closely resemble cooperative equilibria in repeated games, such
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at the prisoner’s dilemma. We know from experiments that groups are highly successful
at achieving efficient outcomes in repeated prisoner’s dilemma and similar games (Dal Bo
[2005]). Hence the third basic question: Can the inefficiencies be overcome? Do efficient
investment paths emerge in these legislative bargaining games, possibly due to the repeated
game effects created by the dynamic environment?
The effect of q on the efficiency of public policy is confirmed by the experimental data.
A higher q rule leads to better public policies in the form of significantly greater public
good investment. Second, besides these qualitative findings, the public good levels are also
quantitatively close to the predictions of the Markov perfect equilibrium. Also consistent
with this equilibrium, players choices reflect forward looking decision making: the theoretical
expected continuation value functions are the most important significant variables explaining
voting behavior. Thus the behavior in these complicated environments appear to be largely
robust to factors outside the model such as bounded rationality and non-selfish preferences.
Of course the data is not a perfect match to the theory. We observe some differences between
the finer details of the theoretical predictions and the data. The clearest such deviation is
a statistically significant overinvestment in the early rounds under all voting rules. This
phenomenon is reminiscent of the finding in experiments on static public good provision (by
a centralized legislature or in a voluntary provision setting), but it is more complex in our
dynamic setting: we observe a large initial overinvestment in the early rounds, however, this
initial overinvestment is to a large extent ”undone” in later rounds, as it is usually followed
by significant disinvestment (in D and M) or lack of further investment (in U) approaching
the equilibrium steady state.
We discuss some related literature in the next section. The formal model is explained
in section 3. Section 4 fully characterizes the dynamically efficient public policy. Section
5 characterizes the Markov perfect equilibrium of the legislative bargaining game. Section
6 describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 7 presents the results of the
experiment.
2 Related Literature
This work contributes primarily to the literature on impact of institutions on the dynamics of
public good provision, which includes the important special case of common-pool resources
management. Walker et al. [2000], Ostrom [1990], and Ostrom et al [1994] examine both
theoretically and empirically how communication, voting rules, and other institutions for
collective decision making affect the outcome of commons dilemma games; Olson [1993] and
McGuire and Olson [1996] compare the negative externalities a democratic majority and an
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autocrat might impose on society; Harrison and Hirschleifer [1989], Duffy et al. [2007], Choi
et al. [2008,2011] examine sequential contribution mechanisms for provision of a public good2;
Boylan and McKelvey [1995] and Boylan et al [1996] study a one-sector model of economic
growth in which decisions about capital accumulation are made by a political process. In
contrast to the present paper, in all these studies the actual dynamics are rudimentary or
nonexistent; either the public good is not durable, in the sense of projecting a stream of
benefits that changes over time along the investment path, the decision on its accumulation
path is taken once and for all at the beginning of the game, or payoffs are one-shot, and
depend only on the sum of investments over the entire horizon.
The emphasis on the comparative performance of different voting rules ties the paper to a
large literature going back to Rousseau [1762], Condorcet [1785], Wicksell [1896], Buchanan
and Tullock [1962] and, more recently, Austen-Smith and Banks [1996], Cox [1987], Messner
and Polborn [2004], Harstad [2005], and many others. Contrary to our analysis, all these
papers focus on static settings and, with the exception of Harstad [2005], deal with purely
distributive politics or reforms with unknown winners (rather than with investment in a pub-
lic project). The debate on the economic consequences of different voting rules has important
practical implications, as we observe a large variety of majority rules in the real world. In a
parliamentary assembly, motions on the floor are usually passed by a simple majority. How-
ever, a broader consent is required in many other contexts. In the European Union’s council
of ministers, some proposals require only a simple majority, some a supermajority and some
unanimous consent. Explicit supermajorities are required in most countries for a constitu-
tional reform, and sixteen US states (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Washington) require a two-thirds supermajority legislative vote in order to
increase taxes. Our finding that a higher majority requirement leads to higher long-run
public investment and hence more dynamically efficient public policy provides a formal ra-
tionale for Wicksell [1896], who, more than a century ago, advocated unanimity as the only
rule guaranteeing Pareto improvements. However, in our dynamic setting, the impact of
the voting rule on the economic outcomes is more complex (and perhaps surprising): even
with unanimity, the accumulation path is predicted to be inefficiently slow and, when the
marginal value of investment is high, a higher majority rule increases, rather than reducing,
the amount of rents an agenda setting proposer can guarantee to the district he represents.
This paper is also the first experimental study of the dynamic accumulation process of
a durable public good by a legislature. Our findings, thus, extend the recent experimen-
tal literature on legislative bargaining models to dynamic settings. McKelvey [1991] is the
2See also the references in those papers.
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first experimental study of legislative bargaining models a` la Baron and Ferejohn [1989].
Diermeier and Gailmard [2006], Diermeier and Morton [2006], Frechette, Kagel, and Lehrer
[2003], and others have also reported laboratory experimental studies of legislative bargain-
ing, but only in a static setting with purely distributive policies. Recently, Frechette, Kagel,
and Morelli [2011] extend the experimental analysis to policy spaces with public goods us-
ing a model based on Volden and Wiseman [2006]. All of these works, however, limit the
analysis to static environments in which only a single policy outcome is decided. Battaglini
and Palfrey [2011] study a simple dynamic model of legislative bargaining, but limit the
analysis to purely distributive policies in which public goods cannot be accumulated and
redistribution across periods is not possible.
Finally, this paper contributes to a growing theoretical literature on dynamic political
economy. The most closely related paper in this branch of the literature is the theoretical
paper by Battaglini and Coate [2006]3, who study public good accumulation in a different
political-economic environment, and consider a different bargaining protocol. Their results
are different from ours because the budget in each period is endogenously determined, there
is distortionary taxation, and preferences are stochastic.
3 The Model
Consider an economy in which a continuum of infinitely lived citizens live in n districts
and each district contains a mass one of citizens. There are two goods: a private good x
and a public good g. An allocation is an infinite nonnegative sequence of public policies,
z = (x∞, g∞) where x∞ = (x11, ..., x
n
1 , ..., x
1
t , ..., x
n
t , ...) and g∞ = (g1, ..., gt, ...). We refer to
zt = (xt, gt) as the public policy in period t. The utility U
j of a representative citizen in
district j is a function of zj = (xj∞, g∞), where x
j
∞ = (x
j
1, ..., x
j
t , ...). We assume that U
j can
be written as:
U j(zj) =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
[
xjt + u(gt)
]
,
where u(·) is continuously twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave on
[0,∞), with limg→0+ u′(g) =∞ and limg→∞+ u′(g) = 0. The future is discounted at a rate δ.
There is a linear technology by which the private good can be used to produce public
good, with a marginal rate of transformation p equal to 1. The private consumption good is
nondurable, while the public good is durable.4 Thus, if the level of public good at time t− 1
3Other recent contributions in dynamic bargaining are Baron [1996], Battaglini and Coate [2008],
Barseghyan, Battaglini, and Coate 2010], Baron, Diermeier and Fong [2011], Duggan and Kalandrakis [2010],
Kalandrakis [2004, 2009], and Penn [2009].
4We assume that the stock of the public good does not depreciate over time, independently from the
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is gt−1 and the investment in the public good is It, then the level of public good at time t
will be:
gt = gt−1 + It.
Because all citizens in district j are identical, we refer collectively to the “behavior of a
district” as described by the behavior of a representative citizen j. Henceforth we will simply
refer to district j. In period t, the economy is endowed with Wt units of private good, where
Wt = W ∀t. The initial stock of public good is g0 ≥ 0, exogenously given.
The public policy in period t is required to satisfy three feasibility conditions:
xjt ≥ 0 ∀j
It + gt−1 ≥ 0 ∀t
It +
n∑
j=1
xjt ≤ Wt ∀t
The first two conditions guarantee that allocations are nonnegative. We assume that
public investment can be scaled back in the future at no cost. The third condition requires
that the current budget is balanced. These conditions can be rewritten slightly. If we denote
y ≡ gt = gt−1 + It as the new level of public good after an investment It when the last
period’s level of the public good is gt−1, then the public policy in period t can be represented
by a vector (y, x1t , ..., x
n
t ). Dropping the t subscripts and substituting y, the budget balance
constraint It +
n∑
j=1
xjt ≤ Wt can be rewritten as:
n∑
j=1
xj + [y − g] ≤ W,
recalling that we use y to denote the post-investment level of public good attained in period
t, and g for the pre-investment level of public good inherited from period t−1. The one-shot
utility to district j from this public policy, (y, x1, ..., xn), is U j = xj + u(y).
Our interest in this paper is to analyze the performance of a class of political procedures
in building public infrastructure, i.e., generating a feasible sequence of public policies, z.
We consider a legislature where representatives of each district bargain with each other to
decide how to divide the current period’s societal endowment between public investment and
private transfers to each district. We will consider procedures that are time independent and
have no commitment. That is, the voting procedures is the same in every period, and the
investment decision. One possible extension is the case in which the public good depreciates at a rate d > 0.
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outcome of the procedure is a public policy for only the current period. The level of the
state variable g, however, creates a dynamic linkage across policy making periods. In such
procedures, we will characterize the outcomes associated with symmetric Markov perfect
equilibria.
4 The Optimal Public Policy
As a benchmark with which to compare the equilibrium allocations by a legislature, we first
analyze the sequence of public policies that maximizes the sum of utilities of the districts.
This is the optimal public policy. This optimization problem has a recursive representation
in which g is the state variable, and the value function vO(g) can be represented recursively
as:
vO(g) = max
y,x
{ ∑n
j=1 x
i + nu(y) + δvO(y)
s.t
∑n
j=1 x
i + y − g ≤ W, xi ≥ 0 ∀i, y ≥ 0
}
(1)
By standard methods (see Stokey and Lucas [1989]) we can show that a continuous, strictly
concave and differentiable vO(g) that satisfies (1) exists and is unique. The optimal policies
have an intuitive characterization.5 When the accumulated level of public good is low, the
marginal benefit of investing in g is high, and it is efficient to invest as much as possible:
in this case yO(g) = W + g and
∑n
j=1 x
i = 0. When g is high, it is efficient to reach the
level of public good y∗O(n) that solves the unconstrained optimization problem in (1): i.e.
nu′(y∗O(n)) + δv
′
O(y
∗
O(n)) = 1. As it can be shown:
y∗O(n) = [u
′]−1
(
1− δ
n
)
(2)
For gO ≥ y∗O(n) −W , therefore, investment will stop, yO(gO) = y∗O(n) and, without loss
of generality, xi = xo = (W + g − y) /n.6
The policy and the investment functions, therefore, have the following simple structure:
yO(g) = min {W + g, y∗O(n)} (3)
IO(g) = min {W, y∗O(n)− g} (4)
This investment function implies that, in the optimal solution, the stock of the public good
converges to a unique steady state, yoO = y
∗
O(n). In y
o
O, the per agent level of private
consumption is positive: x∗ = W/n > 0. Figure 1 provides a representation of the optimal
5A formal derivation of the properties discussed in this sections is available in the appendix.
6The optimal solution does not depend on the distribution of private consumption.
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Figure 1: The Optimal Public Policy
investment path.
5 The Political Equilibrium
We now consider a legislature, composed of a representative from each district, which bar-
gains over the allocation of the economy-wide resources among private goods and public good
investment. In this mechanism, in each period, the legislature decides on a level of invest-
ment in the public good. The legislative policy also includes an allocation of the budgetary
surplus (endowment minus investment) to the districts, which is non-negative for all dis-
tricts, but not necessarily uniform. Investment can be negative, but the amount of negative
investment cannot exceed the current stock of public good. Thus, we can represent a policy
by the legislature at time t, by a public policy (x1t , ..., x
n
t , yt) that satisfies the same feasibility
constraints as in the previous section. The bargaining protocol with which a public policy
is chosen in a legislature is as follows. At the beginning of each period an agent is chosen
by nature to propose a policy (x1, ..., xn, y). Each legislator has the same probability to be
recognized as proposer. If at least q ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} legislators vote in favor of the proposal,
it passes and it is implemented. The legislature then adjourns and meets in the following
period with a new level of public good y. If instead the policy does not receive a qualified
majority, then the status quo policy is implemented. We assume that the status quo is zero
investment in public goods and xj = W/n for all j. The legislature, moreover, adjourns and
meets in the following period with a new level of public good g.
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To characterize behavior when policies are chosen by a legislature we look for a symmetric
Markov perfect equilibrium. In this type of equilibrium, equilibrium strategies depend only
on payoff-relevant information, and all representatives use the same strategy. Therefore,
in a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, any representative selected to propose at some
time t uses the same strategy, and this depends only on the current stock of public good
(g). Similarly, the probability a legislator votes for a proposal depends only on the proposal
itself and the state g. As is standard in the theory of legislative voting, we focus on weakly
stage-undominated strategies, which implies that legislators vote for a proposal if and only
if their expected utility (current payoff plus discounted continuation value) from the status
quo is not greater than their expected utility from the proposal. Without loss of generality,
we focus on an equilibrium in which proposals are accepted with probability one on the
equilibrium path.
It is easy to verify that, in a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, a proposer would
either make no monetary transfer to the other districts, or would make a transfer to exactly
q − 1 legislators. An equilibrium can therefore be described by a collection of functions
{yL(g), sL(g)} that specifies the choice made by the proposer in a period in which the
state is g. Here yL(g) is the proposed new level of public good and sL(g) is a transfer
offered to the q − 1 other districts.7 The proposer’s district receives the surplus revenues
xL(g) = W − yL(g) + g − (q − 1)sL(g). Associated with any symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium in the L game is a value function vL(g) which specifies the expected continuation
payoff of a legislator when the state is g before the proposer is selected.
Contrary to the case of the previous section, the policy is now chosen by a self interested
proposer who maximizes the utility of his own district. Given vL, the proposer’s problem is:
max
x,y,s

x+ u(y) + δvL(y)
s.t
(q − 1)s+ x+ y − g ≤ W
x ≥ 0, s ≥ 0
s+ u(y) + δvL(y) ≥ Wn + u [g] + δvL(g)

(5)
where x is the transfer to the proposer. This problem is similar to the efficient problem (1):
the first inequality is the budget balance constraint, and the following two inequalities are the
feasibility constraints.8 The last inequality is however new: it is the incentive compatibility
constraint that needs to be satisfied if a proposal is to be accepted by q − 1 other districts.
7To ensure symmetry, q − 1 legislators are randomly selected by the proposer.
8Since u′(0) = ∞, the constraint y ≥ 0 is never binding and therefore it can be ignored without loss of
generality.
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The solution to (5) is complicated by the fact that the set of binding constraints is state
dependent and the value function is not typically concave in g. Despite this, the next result
shows a sufficient condition for the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium. We say that
an equilibrium is regular if the associated value function is continuous, non decreasing, and
almost everywhere differentiable, and leads to a strictly concave objective function in (5).
We have:
Proposition 1. There is a δ < 1 and a W > 0 such that for all δ > δ, and all W > W a
regular Markov perfect equilibrium exists in which the public good level is given by
yL(g) =

y∗1 g ≤ g1(y∗1)
y˜(g) g ∈ (g1(y∗1), g2(y∗L)]
y∗L else
(6)
where y∗1 and y
∗
L are constants with y
∗
L > y
∗
1; g1(y
∗
1), g2(y
∗
L) are functions respectively of y
∗
1
and y∗L; and y˜(g) is an increasing function of g.
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There is an intuitive explanation for the shape of the policy function (6). For g ≤ g1(y∗1)
the proposer acts as if the other districts did not exist: he diverts resources only toward his
own district and chooses the investment without internalizing the other districts’ welfare.
This implies that the proposer can choose y∗1 where:
y∗1 ∈ arg max
y
{u(y)− y + δvL(y)} (7)
The other districts accept this policy because the investment y∗1, is sufficiently high to make
this policy better than the status quo. When g ≥ g1(y∗1), the proposer can not afford to
ignore the other districts. He first finds it optimal to “buy” their approval by increasing
g and investing y˜(g) > y∗1 (in the interval (g1(y
∗
1), g2(y
∗
L)]): y˜(g) is chosen large enough to
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint as an equality. For g > g2(y
∗
L), however, the
proposer finds it optimal to provide pork to a minimal winning coalition of districts, and to
invest y∗L. In choosing y now the proposer must internalize the utility of q legislators, so:
y∗L ∈ arg max
y
{qu(y)− y + δqvL(y)} (8)
It is interesting to note that when the proposer’s strategy is constant (at y∗1 or at y
∗
L) we
have a dynamic free rider problem: an increase in investment above, say, y∗L, at t would induce
a proportional reduction in investment at t+1, and so discourage public good accumulation.
9Notice that y∗1 , y˜(g), and y
∗
L also depend on δ, n, and q.
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This is key to understanding underinvestment in the steady state. When yL(g) = y˜(g) the
dynamic free rider problem is mitigated because an increase in g induces an increase in y˜(g).
This occurs because the increase in g makes the incentive constraint at t+1 more binding, so
it forces the proposer in the following period to increase the investment in the public good.
The next result guarantees that the equilibrium outcome is unique:
Proposition 2. For δ > δ, and W > W as defined in Proposition 1, the legislative game
has a unique regular equilibrium steady state, y∗L(q, n) = [u
′]−1
(
n/q−δ
n
)
.
Figure 2: Legislative Game Equilibrium, I(g) and y(g)
Figure 2 provides a representation of the equilibrium. The first panel of Figure 2 repre-
sents the investment function IL(g):
IL(g) =

y∗1 − g g ≤ g1
y˜(g)− g g ∈ (g1, g2]
y∗L − g else
(9)
(where for simplicity g1 is the equilibrium value g1(y
∗
1), and similarly for g2). It is interest-
ing to note that while in the optimal solution IO(g) is a monotonically (weakly) decreasing
function, in the political equilibrium IL(g) is not monotonic (compare (9) with the invest-
ment in the optimal solution, i.e. IO(g) = min {W, y∗O − g}). The non-monotonicity of the
investment function is a consequence of the fact that the incentive compatibility constraint
is not always binding and that the value of the status quo is endogenous. The second panel
of Figure 2 shows the equilibrium proposed level of the public good, as a function of the
state, yL(g). This curve fully describes the dynamics of public good provision and the steady
state. The steady state level of public good y∗L corresponds to the point where the 45
o line
intersects the investment curve.
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How does the accumulation of public good in the political equilibrium compare to the
optimal solution? Do legislatures provide durable public goods efficiently? And how does
this depend on the voting rule adopted? The next result addresses these questions.
Proposition 3. (a). 0 < y∗L(1, n) < y
∗
L(2, n) < . . . < y
∗
L(n, n) = y
∗
O(n); (b) IL(g; q, n) <
IO(g;n) ∀ n > 1, ∀ q = 1, . . . , n, and ∀ g ≤ y∗O(n).
Proposition 3(a) states that the equilibrium steady state of the legislative game is less
than the steady state of the optimal solution for any q-voting rule but unanimity, and it is
equal to the steady state of the optimal solution for q = n (with efficiency monotonically
increasing in q). Proposition 3(b) states that for any voting rule, including unanimity, the
accumulation of the public good that leads to the steady state is inefficiently slow. This
result arises because, in any legislative game (including unanimity), the proposer finds it
profitable to divert some resources towards private transfers to his own district and to q− 1
other districts (as discussed above).
Example. Let the utility function for the public good be the power function, u(y) = 1
α
yα.
The unique long run steady state in the optimal solution is y∗O(n) =
(
n
1−δ
) 1
1−α and the unique
equilibrium steady state of the legislative game is y∗L(n, q) =
(
n
n
q
−δ
) 1
1−α
.
5.1 Non-Markov Equilibria
We have restricted our attention to symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. However, the
legislative game we study is a dynamic game with an infinite horizon with many subgame
perfect equilibria. The Markovian assumption of stationary strategies is very restrictive and
it is possible that some other equilibria can sustain more efficient outcomes through the use
of history-dependent strategies (punishment and rewards for past actions).
This is common in infinite horizon games with perfect information. For instance, the only
Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma has both players
defect in every period. This is because in the prisoner’s dilemma the state variable is null
(i.e. all histories lead to strategically identical subgames) and the only Markov perfect
equilibrium corresponds to the infinite repetition of the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage
game. However, it is well known that cooperation can be sustained by history-dependent
strategies with punishment (Aumann [1959]). Similarly, as we show below, in our legislative
game the public good accumulation in the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is
inefficient but the optimal solution can be supported as the outcome of a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the legislative game.
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Proposition 4. For any q, there is a δ such that for δ > δ the efficient investment path
characterized by the optimal solution is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the legislative
game.
In Appendix A, we derive nonstationary strategies for the legislative game whose outcome
is the efficient level of public good (the optimal solution), and show that these strategies
are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.10 We analyze separately the cases with q = 1,
q = 2, . . . , n− 1, and q = n, because in the two extreme cases the potential for punishment
is reduced.
In all cases, the strategy for the legislator recognized as the proposer is to propose the
optimal level of investment, I∗O(g), and to share equally among all committee members
W − I∗O(g) as private transfers. The voters’ strategy entails voting “yes” to a proposal
in accordance with equilibrium if no prior deviation has been observed and to switch to a
punishment phase after a single deviation by any proposer. Deviation by voters (as well
as deviations from punishment strategies) are punished in the same way as deviation by
proposers.
For q = 2, . . . , n − 1, a deviation is punished by a) rejecting an inefficient proposal;
b) stopping the accumulation of the public good; and c) excluding the deviator from the
distribution of the pork whenever someone else is proposing.
For q = 1, the proposer does not need the approval of any other member to implement
a public policy, and, therefore, there can be no punishment in the event he is recognized
as the proposer. In this case, a deviation is punished by reversion to the Markov perfect
equilibrium characterized in the previous section.
For q = n, everyone’s vote (including the deviator’s) is needed to pass a punitive proposal
and, thus, there is no enforceable harsher punishment than the status quo policy. In this
case, a deviation is punished by implementing the status quo policy in all future periods.
The idea of the proof is simple: the required strategy configurations are such that any
member who deviates from the prescribed proposals or from the prescribed punishment is
certain to be punished. Members expect the punishment to be enforced because they expect
that anyone who fails to punish a deviator will in turn be punished, and so on.
10Our goal is to show that the optimal solution is the outcome of some subgame perfect Nash equilibria
of the legislative game. We do not claim that the strategies proposed in the proof of Proposition 4 are the
best punishment schemes, and there may be different nonstationary strategies that work for lower δ.
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6 Experimental Design
The experiments were all conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL)
using students from the California Institute of Technology. Subjects were recruited from a
database of volunteer subjects. Six sessions were run, using a total of 90 subjects. No subject
participated in more than one session. In all sessions, the committees were composed of five
members (n = 5), the discount factor was 3/4 (δ = 0.75), the exogenous amount of resources
in each period was 20 (W = 20), and the current-round payoff from the public good was
proportional to the square root of the stock at the end of that round (u(y) = 1
α
yα, with
α = 0.5).11 Two sessions were run using a simple majority requirement to pass a proposal
(q = 3, M), two sessions using a unanimity requirement (q = 5, U), and two sessions under a
dictatorship rule (q = 1, D). Table 1 summarizes the theoretical properties of the equilibrium
for the three treatments. It is useful to emphasize that, as proven in the previous section,
given these parameters the steady state is uniquely defined for all treatments.
.
Majority Rule n q (g1,g2) y
∗
1 y
∗
L gP y
∗
P
Simple Majority (M) 5 3 (4,18) 8 29.83 380 400
Dictatorship (D) 5 1 (1,1) - 1.38 380 400
Unanimity (U) 5 5 (4.380) 6 400 380 400
Table 1: Experimental Parameters and Equilibrium
Discounted payoffs were induced by a random termination rule by rolling an eight-sided
die after each round in front of the room, with the outcome determining whether the game
continued to another round (with probability .75) or was terminated (with probability .25).
This is a standard technique used in the experimental literature to preserve the incentives of
infinite horizon games in the laboratory (Roth and Murnigham [1978], Palfrey and Rosenthal
[1994], Dal Bo [2005], Duffy and Ochs [2009]). All sessions were conducted with 15 subjects,
divided into 3 committees of 5 members each. Committees stayed the same throughout the
rounds of a given match, and subjects were randomly rematched into committees between
matches. A match consisted of one multiround play of the game which continued until one
of the die rolls eventually ended the match. As a result, different matches lasted for different
lengths. Table 2 summarizes the design.
11Payoffs in experimental dollars were calibrated so subjects could trade in fractional amounts.We do this
in order to reduce the coarseness of the strategy space and allow subjects to make budget decisions in line
with the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. This is particularly important for the
Dictatorship treatment where the steady state level of the public good is 1.38.
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.Majority Rule n q # Committees # Subjects
Simple Majority (M) 5 3 60 30
Dictatorship (D) 5 1 60 30
Unanimity (U) 5 5 60 30
Table 2: Experimental Design
Before the first match, instructions were read aloud, followed by a practice match and
a comprehension quiz to verify that subjects understood the details of the environment
including how to compute payoffs. The experiments were conducted via computers.12 The
current round’s payoffs from the public good stock (called project size in the experiment)
was displayed graphically, with stock of public good on the horizontal axis and the payoff on
the vertical axis. Subjects could click anywhere on the curve and the payoff for that level of
public good appeared on the screen.
In the M and U treatments, each round had two separate stages, the proposal stage and
the voting stage. At the beginning of each match, each member of a committee was randomly
assigned a committee member number which stayed the same for all rounds of the match. In
the proposal stage, each member of the committee submitted a provisional budget for how to
divide the budget between the public good, called project investment, and private allocations
to each member. After everyone had submitted a proposal, one was randomly selected and
became the proposed budget. Members were also informed of the committee member number
of the proposer, but not informed about the unselected provisional budgets. Each member
then cast a vote either for the proposed budget or for the backup budget with zero public
investment and equal private allocations. The proposed budget passed if and only if it
received at least q votes. Payoffs for that round were added to each subject’s earnings and
a die was rolled to determine whether the match continued to the next round. If it did
continue, then the end-of-round project size became the next round’s beginning-of-round
project size. The D treatment followed the same procedure for the proposal stage, but did
not involve a voting stage: after everyone had submitted a proposal, one was randomly
selected to be the committee decision in that round.
At the end of the last match each subject was paid privately in cash the sum of his or
her earnings over all matches plus a showup fee of $10. Earnings ranged from approximately
$20 to $50, with sessions lasting between one and two hours. There was considerable range
in the earnings and length across sessions because of the random stopping rule.
12The computer program used was an extension to the open source Multistage game software. See
http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu..
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7 Experimental Results
7.1 Public Good Outcomes
7.1.1 Median Public Good Stock
We start the analysis of the experimental results by looking at the long-run stock of public
good by treatment. We consider as the long-run stock of public good, the stock reached by a
committee after 10 rounds of play.13 Table 3 compares the theoretical and observed levels of
public good by treatment. In order to aggregate across committees, we use the median level
of the public good from all committees in a given treatment at round 10 (y10mdn). Similar
results hold if we use the mean or other measures of central tendency.14 We compare this
to the stock predicted by the Markov perfect equilibrium of the legislative game after 10
periods (y10L ), and to the stock accumulated in the optimal solution after 10 periods (y
10
O ).
.
Majority Rule q y10mdn y
10
L y
10
O
Dictatorship (D) 1 12.5 1.38 200
Simple Majority (M) 3 30.33 29.83 200
Unanimity (U) 5 63.13 72 200
Table 3: Long-Run Stock of Public Good, Theory vs. Results by Treatment
How do committees get to these stocks of public good? Figure 3 gives us a richer picture,
showing the time series of the stock of public good by treatment.15 The horizontal axis is
the time period and the vertical axis is the stock of the public good. As in Table 3, we use
the median level of the public good from all committees in a given treatment. Superimposed
on the graphs are the theoretical time paths (represented with solid lines), corresponding to
the Markov perfect equilibria and to the optimal solution.
Table 3 and Figure 3 exhibit several systematic regularities, which we discuss below in
comparison with the theoretical time paths.
13In the experiment, the length of a match is stochastic and determined by the roll of a die. No match
lasted longer than 13 rounds and we have very few observations for rounds 11-13.
14In the D and M treatments, the medians are somewhat higher than the means in early periods and lower
in later periods, but the differences are small. In the appendix, we report averages, medians and standard
errors of the stock of the public good by round for each treatment. The statistical tests in the remainder of
this section compare average stocks between different treatments using t-tests.
15These and subsequent figures show data from the first ten rounds. Data from later rounds (11-13) are
excluded from the graphs because there were so few observations. The data from later rounds are included
in all the statistical analyses.
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Figure 3: Median Time Paths of the Stock of g, All Treatments.
FINDING 1. Higher q leads to higher public good production: Dictatorship
leads to lower public good production than Simple Majority and Unanimity;
Unanimity leads to higher public good production than Simple Majority. Ac-
cording to t-tests16, the average stock of public good is significantly lower in D than in U in
every single period. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value<0.01)
in every period. The stock of public good is larger in M than in D and larger in U than in
M in every single period. These differences are statistically significant for periods 1 through
6.17 The lack of statistical significance for the later rounds is due to the small sample size
for the M treatment.18
Not only are the differences statistically significant, but they are large in magnitude. The
median stock of public good is two times greater in the U treatment than in the D treatment,
averaged across all 13 rounds for which we have data (20.1 in D vs. 34.7 in M vs. 39.8 in
16The p-values associated with these tests are reported in the appendix. The null hypothesis of a t-test is
that the averages in the two samples are the same. We are treating as unit of observation a single committee.
17The difference between the average in D and the average in M is significant at the 5% level (p-value<0.05)
in periods 1,2,3,4, and 6 and significant at the 1% level (p-value<0.01) in period 5. The difference between
the average in U and the average in M is significant at the 1% level (p-value<0.01) in periods 2,3, and 4,
and significant at the 5% level (p-value<0.05) in periods 1, 5, and 6.
18Due to the stochastic length of each match, only 6 committees reached round 7 or above, and only 3
committees reached round 10 in the M treatment.
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U). The differences between the three voting rules are relatively small in the initial round,
but they increase sharply as more rounds are played. By round 10, the differences are very
large (12.5 vs. 30.3 vs. 63.1).
FINDING 2. All voting rules lead to significantly inefficient long-run public
good levels. The optimal steady state is y*=400 and the optimal investment policy is
the fastest approach: invest W in every period until y* is achieved. After 10 rounds, the
median stock of public good achieved with the optimal investment trajectory is 200. With
a legislature, the median stock of public good levels out at about 15 under dictatorship,
at about 30 under simple majority, and at about 60 under unanimity. The median stock
averages 14.5 in rounds 7-10 in D, 31.8 in rounds 7-10 in M, and 57.9 in rounds 7-10 in
U. These very inefficient long run public good levels occur in spite of initial round median
investment that is fully efficient (I=W) in M and U19 and very close to efficiency (I=0.94W)
in D. In all treatments the average stock of public good in the last rounds (rounds 8 on) is
significantly smaller than the level predicted by the optimal solution (the level attainable
investing W each round) according to the results of a t-test on the equality of means (p-
value<0.01).
FINDING 3. In all voting rules, there is overinvestment relative to the equi-
librium in the early rounds. This is followed by either negative investment (in
the D and the M treatment) or by zero investment (in the U treatment) ap-
proaching the theoretical predictions. The median investment in the first two rounds
are (18.8, 11.3) in D, (20, 10.7) in M, and (20, 20) in U. As a result the median public good
stock by the end of round 2 equals, respectively, 26.3, 30.7 and 40. This compares with
equilibrium investment policies in the first two rounds equal to (1.38, 0) for D, (8, 6) for
M, and (6, 6) for U, and a predicted stock equal to 1.38 for D, 14 for M, and 12 for U.20
Thus, in all treatments, committees overshoot the equilibrium in early rounds by a factor of
twenty (D), two (M) and three (U). This overshooting is largely corrected in later rounds,
either via disinvestment (in D and M) or an arrest in investment (in U). In the M treatment,
convergence is especially close to equilibrium, with the difference between the median public
good levels and the equilibrium public good levels in the last 4 rounds of data measuring
less than 2 units of the public good (31.79 vs. 29.83). A similar pattern of overshooting
in the D mechanisms is also evident. Beginning in round 4, the stock of public good in D
declines sharply, with the median public good stock averaging 16.6 in rounds 4-10. In U,
19In M efficient investment occurs only in the first round, while in U it occurs in the first two rounds.
20The difference between the average investment in the early rounds and the predicted investment in these
same rounds is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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the investment slows down considerably after the second round: the median investment in
rounds 3-10 is 0. Given the nature of the equilibrium investment function for this voting
rule (a convex function), the investment cessation following the initial overshooting, brings
the level of the stock closer to the predicted one and, eventually, below it (the median stock
in round 10 is 63.1 vs. a predicted stock of 72).
7.1.2 Variation Across Committees
Because of the possibility of nonstationary equilibria it is natural to expect a fair amount
of variation across committees. Figure 3, by showing the median time path of the stock of
public good, masks some of this heterogeneity. Do some committees reach full efficiency?
Are some committees at or below the equilibrium? We turn next to these questions.
Figure 4 illustrates the variation across committees by representing, for each round, the
first, second and third quartile of investment levels for the D (panel (a)), M (panel (b)), and
U game (panel (c)).
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Figure 4: Quartiles of time paths of g, (a) Dictatorship, (b) Simple Majority, (c) Unanimity. The
number of observations (committees) per round is reported on the x axis below the round number.
There was remarkable consistency across committees, especially considering this was a
complicated infinitely repeated game with many non-Markov equilibria.21 There were a few
21In periods 6-10 of the M treatment the top quartile continues to increase. However, this is due to a
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committees who invested significantly more heavily than predicted by the Markov perfect
equilibrium, but this only happened rarely, and nearly always such cooperation fell apart in
later rounds. The most efficient committee in M invested W in each of the first 7 rounds,
resulting in a public good level of 140. That committee did not invest anything for the
remaining 2 rounds. Even this very successful committee stopped investing well short of the
efficient level (400). The most efficient committee in D invested W in each of the first 4
rounds, resulting in a public good level of 80. That committee disinvested the entire stock
of public good in the following round. In U only two committees reached levels above 80
and not a single committee invested W for more than 4 consecutive rounds.
These findings are perhaps surprising since, from Proposition 4, we know that, for the
parameters of the experiment, the optimal solution can indeed be supported as the outcome
of the game in M and U using nonstationary strategies (at least for the first 10 rounds).
In D, even if the parameters of the experiment do not allow an efficient level of the public
good to be attainable in equilibrium, using nonstationary strategies can sustain a level of the
public good much higher than the one predicted by the Markov perfect equilibrium, namely
around 50 (with respect to 1.38). Figure 3 and 4, therefore, make clear that the predictions
of the Markov perfect equilibrium are substantially more accurate than the prediction of the
“best” subgame perfect equilibrium (that is the Pareto superior equilibrium from the point
of view of the agents), even when this best equilibrium is unique and reasonably focal (being
the efficient solution). This observation may undermine the rationale for using the “best
equilibrium” as a solution concept.
7.2 Strategies and Behavior
7.2.1 Proposals and Coalitions
We now turn to a descriptive analysis of the proposed allocation of pork, as a function of
g and q. For this analysis we focus primarily on the number of members receiving signif-
icant amounts of pork in the proposed allocation, and whether the proposals had negative
investment in the public good. We break down the proposed allocations into 4 canonical
types. These types are: (1) Invest W : 100% allocation to the public investment; (2) Pro-
poser only : The allocation divided between public investment and private consumption of
the proposer only; (3) Proposer + 2 : The allocation divided between public investment and
a coalition that includes the proposer and two other members of the committee (notice that
this is a minimal winning coalition in M); (4) Universal : Positive private allocations to all
small sample size: only 2 committees are in the third quartile for periods 6-9, and only one for period 10.
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five members.22 The last three categories are further broken down by whether investment in
the public good is positive, zero, or negative.
Dictatorship Simple Maj Unanimity
Proposal Type % Prop. % Prop. % Acc. % Prop. % Acc.
INVEST W 27% 43% 92% 58% 80%
PROPOSER ONLY
* with positive inv 16% 3% 100% 3% 0%
* with no inv 7% 1% 0% - -
* with negative inv 14% - - - -
PROPOSER + 2
* with positive inv 1% 7% 85% - -
* with no inv - 5% 77% - -
* with negative inv - 6% 72% - -
UNIVERSAL
* with positive inv 19% 21% 84% 29% 67%
* with no inv 2% 2% 46% 4% 6%
* with negative inv 3% 5% 56% 6% 19%
Table 4: Proposal Types, # Observations: 330 for D, 204 for M and 330 for U.
Table 4 shows the breakdown of proposals for the three treatments. In each table, the
first column lists the various proposal types. The second column lists the proportion of
proposals of each type that were proposed at the provisional stage (i.e., before a proposal
was randomly selected to be voted on). The final column gives the proportion of proposals
of each type that passed when they were voted on.
FINDING 4. In all treatments, most proposals are either (i) invest the entire
budget; or (ii) universal private allocations with positive investment. The pro-
portion of proposals that belong to these two categories increases with the ma-
jority requirement adopted. With all voting rules, most proposals were to either invest
22There are two residual categories, not shown in the table, where pork is offered to exactly 2 or 4 members.
In M and U, pork was never offered to exactly 2 members; there were only 21 provisional proposals with
pork offered exactly to 4 members and, when these were observed, they were always accepted. In D, around
11% of provisional proposals belong to these two categories: 32 provisional proposals offer pork to exactly 2
members and 154 to exactly 4 members.
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W or universal allocations with a positive amount of investment. In D, these two proposal
types account for 46% of all budget proposals (including provisional budget proposals); in M
and U, these two types account, respectively, for 64% and 86%. Of the remaining proposals,
approximately half were MWC proposals (17% of all provisional budgets in L5 committees
and 12% in L3 committees). Proposals that offered private allocation to the proposer only
were quite rare in both treatments. Proposals with zero or negative investment occurred
21% of the time in L5 committees and 16% of the time in L3 committees. In contrast to the
data, the Markov perfect equilibrium proposals should have been concentrated in the two
categories: ”proposer only” and MWC. However, it should be noted that even when pork is
provided to more than a minimum winning coalition, most of the pork is concentrated on a
minimum winning coalition.
Since one of the most common proposal type is one where some pork is offered to all
members of the committee, it is interesting to check whether transfers are egalitarian or
whether they favors a minimal winning coalition of voters or the proposer. Figure 5 shows
the cumulative distribution of transfers in provisional proposals when committee members
are ordered in decreasing amount of pork.
Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution of Pork, All Treatments.
FINDING 5. In D and M, a minimal winning coalitions of players receives a
more than proportional share of transfers. In U, when pork is proposed, transfers
are egalitarian. In the D treatment, when positive pork is allocated, 75% of the pork
goes to the proposer. In the M treatment, when positive pork is allocated, 80% of it goes
to the proposer and two other coalition partners and over 90% goes to the proposer and
22
three other committee members. Thus, universal allocations are not equitable in the sense
of giving non-proposers the same amount of pork. In U, instead, everyone gets a very similar
amount of pork: the proposer gets 23% of pork, and the member who get the least amount
of pork still gets 19% of the total resources allocated to private transfers.
7.2.2 Voting Behavior
6.2.2.1 Testing for Forward Looking Behavior
Table 5 displays the results from logit regressions23 where the dependent variable is vote
(0=no;1=yes). An observation is a single voter’s vote decision on a single proposal. The
proposer’s vote is excluded.24 The data is broken down according to the treatment (M or
U). The independent variables are: EU(status quo), the expected value to the voter of a
“no” outcome (including the discounted theoretical continuation value); EU(proposal), the
expected value to the voter of a “yes’ outcome; and pork, the amount of private allocation
offered to the voter under the current proposal. Theoretically, a voter should vote yes if
and only if the expected utility of the proposal passing is greater than or equal to the
expected utility of the status quo. This would imply a negative coefficient on EU(status
quo) and a positive coefficient on EU(proposal), with the magnitudes of these coefficients
being approximately equal. The effect of pork should be fully captured by EU(proposal) and
therefore, we do not expect a significant coefficient on pork.
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Treatment M M U U
EU(proposal)-EU(sq) 0.12*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.01)
EU(proposal) 0.13*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.01)
EU(status quo) -0.12*** (0.02) -0.11*** (0.01)
Constant 0.29 (0.10) -1.20 (0.81) 1.05 (0.79) -0.45 (0.37)
Pseudo-R2 0.2899 0.2943 0.2049 0.2104
Observations 816 816 1032 1032
Table 5: Logit estimates. Dependent var: Pr {vote=yes}. SE in parentheses; * significant at 10%
level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
23The results presented in Tables 5 and 7 are robust to the use of a Probit specification.
24Proposers vote for their own proposals nearly 100% of the time (203 times out of 204 in M, and 254
times out of 258 in U).
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FINDING 6. Voters are forward looking. The results from Tables 5 are clear. The
main effect on voting is through the difference between the expected utility of the status quo
and the proposal. The signs of the coefficients are highly significant, large in magnitude,
and not significantly different from each other in absolute value. The constant term is not
significantly different from zero, suggesting that voters are not a priori inclined to favor or
disfavor proposals.
6.2.2.2 Proposals Acceptance Rates
The theory predicts that all proposals should pass. Is this consistent with the data?
Table 4 displays the probability the proposal passes for each type of proposal (for M and U).
FINDING 7. The vast majority of proposals pass. Overall, 84% of the M proposals
and 69% of the U proposals receive committee support. Many of the M proposals are
unanimously supported, especially the “invest W” proposals and the universal proposals
with positive investment.25
Acceptance rates differ by type of proposal. Some kinds of proposals are rejected some-
what frequently. This is particularly true for proposals with negative investment. In M
committees, only 59% of proposals with negative investment pass and in U committees, only
19% pass. Proposals that give private allocation only to the proposer also fare relatively
poorly, passing 71% of the time in M committees and 0% of the time in U committees. The
most common proposal types, “invest W” and universal with positive investment, nearly
always pass. The acceptance rates for proposals to invest everything are 95% and 68% for
the M and U treatments, respectively. The corresponding acceptance rates for universal pro-
posals with positive investment are 97% and 74%. One surprise in the data is the relatively
low acceptance rates for MWC proposals in M.
Even if our legislative game is different from the standard Baron-Ferejohn setting, it
is interesting to note that these numbers are in line with the acceptance rates for first
round proposals in experiments testing that bargaining protocol (with simple majority): in
Frechette et al. [2003] 96.4% of first round proposals are accepted (closed rule treatment),
while in Kagel et al. [2010] 89% of first round proposals pass when the cost of delay is high
and 72% pass when the cost of delay is low (both numbers refer to the control treatment
without a veto player).
Table 6 instead displays the percentage of accepted proposals that are predicted by theory
to be accepted and the percentage of refused proposals that predicted by the theory to be
25In M, 67% of the “invest all” proposals pass unanimously, and 40% of universal proposals with positive
investment pass unanimously.
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refused, divided by proposal type. Theoretically, a legislator should support a proposal if the
expected value to him of a “no” outcome (including the discounted theoretical continuation
value) is smaller than the expected value to him of a “yes” outcome. We say that theory
predicts a proposal to pass in M (U) if the expected utility of the proposal passing is greater
than or equal to the expected utility of the status quo for at least three (for all five) legislators.
Simple Maj Unanimity
Proposal Type % Acc as Pr % Rej as Pr % Acc as Pr % Rej as Pr
INVEST W 100% (86) 0% (2) 100% 0% (28)
PROPOSER ONLY
* with positive inv 100% (5) - - 0% (7)
* with no inv - 0% (2) - -
* with negative inv - - - -
PROPOSER + 2
* with positive inv 100% (11) 0% (5) - -
* with no inv 100% (7) 0% (6) - -
* with negative inv 60% (5) 100% (4) - -
UNIVERSAL
* with positive inv 100% (37) 0% (3) 100% (48) 0% (23)
* with no inv 0% (1) 80% (5) 100% (3) 0% (17)
* with negative inv 0% (4) 100% (5) 0% (1) 77% (13)
Table 6: Proposal Acceptance Rates, Theory vs. Experiments. “% Acc as Pr” is the percentage of
accepted proposal that theory predicts to pass and “% Ref as Pr” is the percentage of refused
proposals that theory predicts to be refused. The number of observations is in parentheses.
The theory does remarkably well. Overall, the voting outcome is correctly predicted by
the theory around 85% of the times for M and around 70% of the time for U. The cases
the theory fails to predict are proposals with positive investment that should be rejected
but instead pass and proposals with negative or no investment that should be accepted but
instead fail.
One possible explanation for this discrepancy between voting behavior and theoretical
prediction is that, rather than playing a stationary equilibrium, some committees are sup-
porting more efficient allocations by using non-stationary strategies. This possibility is in
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line with recent experimental results on repeated games: Dal Bo [2005] and Dal Bo and
Frechette [2011] suggest the likelihood that in this games the infinite horizon dynamics allow
efficient or nearly efficient public goods provision.
6.2.2.3 Behavioral Factors Affecting Voting
We next explore the extent to which voting behavior depends on factors other than just
the expected utility from the status quo and the expected utility from the current policy
proposal (this is the basic assumption from the Markov perfect equilibrium). For instance,
the voting behavior could be affected by non-stationary strategies or other-regarding pref-
erences. Table 7 reports the results of a logit regression of voting behavior on the same
variables in Table 5, but includes three additional regressors that could indicate some degree
of punishment or reward behavior being used to affect proposals and support equilibrium
outcomes that differ from the theoretical stationary solutions: the proposed investment level
I; a Herfindahl index, h, that captures how unequal the proposed division of pork is across
committee members; and the amount of own-private allocation by the proposer (that we
call “greed”). In case of non-stationary behavior, the sign on I should be positive (in the
sense that voting strategies punish proposals that do not offer sufficient public good), while
the sign on h and greed should be negative (in the sense that greedier or less egalitarian
proposals are punished with more negative votes).
(1) (2)
Treatment M U
EU(status quo) -0.15*** (0.03) -0.15*** (0.01)
EU(proposal) 0.14*** (0.03) 0.14*** (0.01)
pork 0.17*** (0.04) 0.17** (0.07)
I 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
h -1.20 (1.07) 0.83 (0.94)
greed -2.05*** (0.71) -0.31 (0.28)
constant 0.62 (0.99) -2.043* (1.22)
Pseudo-R2 0.3230 0.2340
Observations 576 1032
Table 7: Logit estimates. Dependent var: Pr {vote=yes}. Including i, h, and greed. SE in
parentheses; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
The results are presented in Table 7. First of all, we notice that adding these new vari-
ables does not change the main result from Table 5: the coefficients on EU(statusquo) and
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EU(proposal) still have the correct (opposite) signs, are not significantly different from each
other, and they are highly significant. Some of the new factors we introduced in our analysis
in Table 7 are statistically significant but have a smaller impact. For the M treatment, all
three of the “non-stationary” variables have the expected sign, and two are highly signifi-
cant (I and greed). More efficient proposals receive greater support, as do proposals that
are less greedy. The size of the positive sign of the effect of I, however, seems too small
to provide evidence in favor of an equilibrium in which non Markovian strategies reward
efficient behavior, especially since a positive sign is consistent with equilibrium behavior.26
Because of this, we are reluctant to conclude that the significant coefficient on I is indicative
of nonstationary behavior. On the other hand the significance of the coefficient of greed
demonstrates the existence of voting behavior that rewards exactly the types of proposals
we see more of relative to the equilibrium predictions (invest W and universal). Results for
the U treatment are similar, but the new variables have less importance in explaining the
variance in voting behavior: I, h, and greed all the have the right sign but here only I is
significant.
We conclude from this analysis that there is some evidence of the use of non-stationary
strategies but that subjects are forward looking, the main determinant of voting being the
difference between the expected utility of the status quo and the proposal.
8 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper investigated the dynamic provision of durable public goods by a legislature,
operating with procedures that entail bargaining and voting. Despite the fact that most,
if not all, public goods provided by governments are durable, very little is known on this
subject, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. We attempt to provide a first
answer to some basic questions that can be helpful as a starting point for further research
on the politics of dynamic public good provision.
The main questions we ask are: Do legislatures provide public goods efficiently in a dy-
namic setting? To what extent does this depend on the voting rule adopted by the floor?
The theoretical properties of the Markov perfect equilibrium in our legislative bargaining
game imply that the steady state level of public investment approved by a legislature is inef-
ficiently low for any voting rule but unanimity: the inefficiency of the long-run steady state
decreases with the majority requirement adopted and disappears completely when a proposal
26In the M treatment, the significant coefficient on I is probably due to spurious correlation. When g is
small, the equilibrium predicts a high investment level and a unanimous yes vote; when g is high, investment
is predicted to be smaller, and proposals are predicted to pass by a bare majority.
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on resources allocation passes only with a unanimous vote. However, even with unanimity,
convergence to the steady state is inefficiently slow, as the proposer will appropriate rents
along the path.
The experimental analysis on three alternative voting rules (Simple Majority and the
two polar extremes, Dictatorship and Unanimity) supports these key predictions. A higher
majority requirement leads unambiguously to significantly higher public good production.
This result confirms, from an experimental point of view, the importance of institutions in
public good provision, and the fact that incentives matter in a way predicted by complex
theoretical models. In all cases, investment is generally below the Pareto efficient levels,
regardless of the voting rule used. Although we often observe more investment than predicted
in the early stage of the game, overinvestment does not persist: the long run public good
levels approximate the Markov perfect equilibrium steady state.
The final questions we attempt to address are: To what extent are the models we use
adequate to study this problem? What equilibrium concepts should be used? This is a
particularly important question since, depending on the equilibrium concept, we can have
very different predictions for the same model. It is clearly difficult to identify the equilib-
rium adopted by players, but the analysis of proposal and voting behavior provides some
interesting insights. First, as discussed in Section 6.1.2, we observe a consistent pattern of
behavior across committees, despite the fact that we have multiplicity of potential equilibria.
The Markov perfect equilibrium that we have adopted as benchmark does not fully capture
the complexity of the agents’ strategies, which also depend to a limited extent on additive
history-dependent variables as the distribution of pork in previous periods. However, these
nonstationary effects are small and the Markovian equilibrium benchmark is far closer to the
data than the prediction of the best subgame equilibrium sustainable with nonstationary
strategies, the alternative benchmark that is routinely applied when studying cooperation
in repeated games. In our setting, this alternative would predict efficient outcomes for any
q > 1, which is far off the mark.
There are many possible directions for the next steps in this research. On the experimen-
tal side, our design was intentionally very simple and used a limited set of treatments. The
theory has interesting comparative static predictions about the effect of other parameters of
the model that we have not explored in this work, such as: the discount factor; the produc-
tion technology; preferences; and endowments. Any of these would be useful extensions of
our experimental design. We have also limited the analysis to legislatures that differ on the
q-rule adopted and use a specific procedure. It would be interesting to consider the impact of
different proposal and voting procedures (e.g. alternating offer bargaining without a status
quo alternative, a` la Baron and Ferejohn [1989]). Moreover, our political process does not
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have elections and parties, and there is no executive branch or “president” to oversee the
general interest common to all districts. Elections, parties, and non-legislative branches are
all important components of democratic political systems, and incorporating such institu-
tions into our framework would be a useful and challenging direction to pursue. Finally, it
would be interesting to allow for a richer set of preferences and feasible allocations, such as
allowing for diversity of preferences or multiple public goods.
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Appendix A - Proofs of Propositions
The Optimal Public Policy
In the steady state y(y∗O) = y
∗
O and x(y
∗
O) > 0. Since y(g) is constant for g ≥ max {y∗O −W, 0},
it is straightforward to show that the derivative of the value function in this region is
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v′(g) = ∂
∂g
[W + g − y∗O + nu (y∗O) + δvO(y∗O)] = 1. Using the first order condition for op-
timality, we must have nu′ (y∗O) + δ = 1, so:
y∗O = [u
′]−1
(
1− δ
n
)
(10)
Proof of Proposition 1
Define a function
v1L(g) =
W − (y∗L − g)
n
+ u(y∗L) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u (y∗L)
]
=
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u (y∗L)
]
+
g − y∗L
n
.
where y∗L = [u
−1]′ (n/q−δ
n
). Note that this function is continuous, increasing, concave, and
differentiable with respect to g, with ∂
∂g
v1L(g) =
1
n
. Now define y˜(g) implicitly by the
equation:
u(y˜(g)) + δv1L(y˜(g)) = W/n+ u(g) + δ
[
W − y˜(g) + g
n
+ u(y˜(g)) + δv1L(y˜(g))
]
This equation can be rewritten as:
u(y˜(g)) (1− δ) + δ
n
y˜(g) = u(g) +
δ2
n
g +
W
n
− δ
(
u(y∗L)− (1− δ)
y∗L
n
)
(11)
Note that (11) implicitly defines a differentiable and increasing function of g. To see this
note that differentiating (11) with respect to y˜ and g we have:
y˜′(g) =
u′(g) + δ
2
n
(1− δ)u′(y˜(g)) + δ
n
> 0 (12)
We can therefore define a point g2L = min [g ≥ 0 |y˜(g) ≥ y∗L ]. This point has the property
that for any g ≥ g2L, we have y˜(g) ≥ y∗L; moreover, g2L < y∗L. Now define the function:
v2L(g) =
{
v1L(g) g > g
2
L
W−ey(g)+g
n
+ u(y˜(g)) + δv1L(y˜(g)) else
(13)
Let g > 0 be defined by g = u′−1(1). We have:
Lemma A.1. There is a δ such that for δ > δ, y˜(g) and v2L(g) are increasing and continuous
and concave respectively in g ∈ [g, g2L], and in g ≥ g2L.
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Proof. We showed above that y˜′(g) > 0. Furthermore, differentiating (12) with respect to
g, we have:
y˜′′(g) =
u′′(g)
[
(1− δ)u′(y˜(g)) + δ
n
]− [u′(g) + δ2
n
]
(1− δ)u′′(y˜(g))y˜′(g)[
(1− δ)u′(y˜(g)) + δ
n
]2 (14)
It is clear that there is a δ such that for δ > δ, y˜′′(g) < 0 for any g ∈ [g, g2L]. To see this
note that for δ = 1 we have y˜′′(g) < 0, as the numerator of (14) is smaller than 0 and its
denominator greater than 0, and recall that y˜(g) is continuous. For v2L(g), note that for
g ≥ g2L the function is linear. For g ≤ g2L
v2L(g) =
W − y˜(g) + g
n
+ u(y˜(g)) + δv1L(y˜(g))
=
W − y˜(g) + g
n
+ u(y˜(g)) + δ
[
W − (y∗L − y˜(g))
n
+
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u (y∗L)
]]
=
W + g
n
+ u(y˜(g)) + (δ − 1) y˜(g)
n
+ δ
[
W − y∗L
n
+
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u (y∗L)
]]
so concavity in [g, g2L] follows from the concavity of y˜(g) for δ sufficiently large. Concavity
in g ≥ g2L follows from the fact that in this range v2L(g) is differentiable everywhere except
at most at g2L, and its derivative is non increasing in g. 
Define y∗1 = arg maxy′ {u(y′)− y′ + δv2L(y′)} and g1L = min [g ≥ 0 |y˜(g) ≥ y∗1 ] . Note that
y∗1 < y
∗
L = [u
′]−1
(
n/q−δ
n
)
, an upper bound that is independent of W , and g1L ≤ g2L; moreover
g ≤ g1L, implies y˜(g) ≤ y∗1. We can now construct the following value function:
v∗L(g) =
{
v2L(g) g ≥ g1L
W−y∗1+g
n
+ u(y∗1) + δv
1
L(y
∗
1) else
which is a continuous and non decreasing function of g. We can also construct the strategies:
y∗L(g) =

y∗1 g ≤ g1L
y˜(g) g ∈ (g1L, g2L]
y∗L else
and x∗L(g) = W − yL(g) + g− (q− 1)sL(g). We now show that the value function v∗L(g) and
the strategies y∗L(g) and x
∗
L(g) are an equilibrium for a sufficiently large W and δ. Consider
the Proposer’s problem (5). One of two cases is possible. First, the incentive compatibility
constraint is not binding, so the proposer can effectively ignore the other legislators. Second,
the incentive compatibility constraint binds and so the proposer has either to modify the
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level of public good, or provide pork transfers to a minimal winning coalition or both.
Case 1: non binding IC. Assume first that we can ignore the incentive compatibility
constraint and set s = 0. The problem becomes:
max
y
{
W − [y − g] + u(y) + δv∗L(y)
s.t. W − y + g ≥ 0
}
(15)
If we ignore the constraint in (15), then it is optimal (without loss of generality) to choose
y such that:
y ∈ arg max
y′
{u(y′)− y′ + δv∗L(y′)} (16)
It is useful to have the following result:
Lemma A.2. The threshold g1L is a non increasing continuous function of W and for any
ε there is a Wε such that for W > Wε, then g
1
L < ε.
Proof. Let k be defined as before by u′(k) = 1. Then since v2L(y) is non decreasing in y,
y∗1 ≥ k > 0. Let f(W ) be defined by
u(y∗1)(1− δ) +
δ
n
y∗1 = u(f(W )) +
δ2
n
f(W )− W
n
+ δ
(
u(y∗L)− (1− δ)
y∗L
n
)
So g1L = max{0, f(W )}. Since f(W ) is a continuous decreasing function of W , it is then
immediate that g1L is a continuous and monotonically non increasing function of W . It is
also immediate to verify that for any ε > 0 there is a Wε such that g
1
L < ε for W > Wε. 
By Lemma A.2 we can find a W1 such that for W > W1, g
1
L is sufficiently small to
guarantee that u′(y) + δv∗′L (y) > 1 for any g ≤ g1L, so
y ∈ arg max
y′
{u(y′)− y′ + δv∗L(y′)}
implies y > g1L. Lemma A.1 then guarantees that for δ ≥ δ the unique solution to (15) is y∗1.
It is easy to see that in correspondence to y∗1 we have xL(g) ≥ 0 if and only if g is greater
than or equal to max {y∗1 −W, 0}. Since y∗1 is bounded, this is verified for any g ≥ 0 when
W > W1, and W1 is chosen to be sufficiently large. The incentive compatibility constraint is
satisfied if and only if y˜(g) ≤ y∗1 that is if g ≤ g1L. We can therefore conclude that, for δ > δ
and W > W1, when g ≤ g1L the optimal policy is y∗L(g) and x∗L(g).
Case 2: binding IC constraint. When g > g1L the incentive compatibility constraint can
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not be ignored. In this case, the problem solved by the proposer is:
max
y,s

[W − [y − g]− (q − 1)s] + u(y) + δv∗L(y)
s.t.s+ u(y) + δv∗L(y) ≥ Wn + u (g) + δv∗L(g)
s ≥ 0
 (17)
Note that we can assume without loss of generality that the solution to this problem is larger
or equal than y∗1 (if this were not the case, by increasing y the proposer would increase his
utility and relax the constraint, a contradiction). By Lemma A.1, it follows that we can treat
(17) as a concave maximization problem when δ ≥ δ. There are two possibilities. First,
the proposer continues to provide no consumption to the districts of other legislators, but he
increases the provision of the public good yL(g) in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint (no transfer case). Second, he provides consumption to the districts of q−1 other
legislators and to his own district (transfers case).
Consider the second case first, assuming s > 0. We can write (17) as:
max
y
{
W − [y − g]
−(q − 1) [W
n
+ Ψ(g)−Ψ(y)]+ Ψ(y)
}
(18)
where Ψ(·) = u(·)+δvL(·). Choosing an optimum in problem (18) is equivalent to choosing an
optimum in problem: maxy {qΨ(y)− y}. So an optimal choice for the proposer is to propose
yL(g) = y
∗
L This case is feasible only if s =
W
n
+ Ψ (g) − Ψ (y∗L) ≥ 0, that is if and only if
g ≥ g2L. In the case in which g ∈ [g1, g2] then we must have u(y)+δvL(y) = Wn +u [g]+δvL(g),
so the chosen y is y˜(g). It follows that in this range the optimal proposal is y∗L(g) and x
∗
L(g).
Finally, we need to show that v∗L(g) is the expected utility of a player when the strategies
are y∗L(g), x
∗
L(g). This is immediate for g > g
2
L. For g ∈ [0, g2L], observe that, by a similar
argument as in Lemma A.2, for for any γ there is a Wγ such that for W > Wγ, then
y˜(y∗1) > γ. It follow that when W > Wg2L , y
∗
L(g) = y˜(g) > g
2
L for any g ∈ (g1L, g2L], so in
this range the value function is given by (13). Finally it is easy to see that for W > Wg2L ,
y˜(y˜(g)) ≥ y˜(y∗1) > g2L, so the value function is v∗L(g) in [0, g2L]. We conclude that there is a
δ, W such that for δ > δ and W > W the value function v∗L(g) and the strategies y
∗
L(g) and
x∗L(g) are an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
Fix q,W, δ, and n, such that δ > δ and W > W as defined in Proposition 1. Consider
any regular equilibrium v(g), y(g), x(g), with steady state y∗. We need to prove that y∗ =
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[u′]−1
(
n/q−δ
n
)
. The incentive compatibility constraint in state g if policy y(g) is chosen is:
s(y(g)) ≥ W
n
+ Ψ(g)−Ψ(y(g))
where Ψ(·) = u(·) + δv(·). In the steady state, this condition becomes: s(y∗) ≥ W
n
+ Ψ(y∗)−
Ψ(y∗) = W/n > 0. In equilibrium, this constraint is satisfied with equality (if not, the
proposer could decrease s and be better off). The proposer’s policy must therefore solve:
max
y
{
W − [y − y∗]
−(q − 1) [W
n
+ Ψ(y∗)−Ψ(y)]+ Ψ(y)
}
(19)
By continuity of Ψ(·), for any g in a neighborhood of y∗, s(g) > 0. By continuity of
the value function, this implies v(g) = 1
1−δ
[
W
n
+ u (y∗)
]
+ g−y
∗
n
in a neighborhood of y∗,
implying v′(g) = 1
n
. This fact, together with the first order necessary condition of (19)
(qu′(y) + qδv′L(y) = 1), implies y
∗ = [u′]−1
(
n/q−δ
n
)
. 
Proof of Proposition 3
We first prove the claims regarding the steady state. The unique equilibrium steady state
in the optimal solution is y∗O = [u
′]−1
(
1−δ
n
)
and the unique equilibrium steady state in the
legislative game is y∗L = [u
′]−1
(
n/q−δ
n
)
. Notice that 1−δ
n
≤ n/q−δ
n
for any q = 1, . . . n, n > 0,
and δ > 0. Since u(·) is, by assumption, increasing and concave (i.e. u′(g) > 0, u′′(g) < 0),
this implies that y∗O ≥ y∗L for any q = 1, . . . n, n > 0, and δ > 0. This inequality is strict when
q = 1, . . . n− 1 (i.e. when n/q > 1) and y∗O = y∗L when q = n (i.e. when n/q = 1). Moreover,
notice that n/q−δ
n
is monotonically decreasing in q. Therefore, y∗L is monotonically increasing
in q. Since y∗O is independent of q, this also mean that the efficiency of the equilibrium steady
state in the legislative game is monotonically increasing in q.
We now want to show that - with n > 1 and q = n - even if y∗L = y
∗
O, the convergence
to y∗L is slower than the convergence to y
∗
O. In order to do this, we will compare the two
investment functions, IO(g) and IL(g):
IO(g) = min {W, y∗O − g}
IL(g) =

y∗1 − g g ≤ g1
y˜(g)− g g ∈ (g1, g2]
y∗L − g else
First notice that, when n > 1, y∗L = y
∗
O > y
∗
1 and y
∗
L = y
∗
O > y˜(g) for any g < g2. There
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are two cases: 1) g1 = 0, 2) g1 > 0. If g1 = 0, for any g < g2, IL(g) = y˜(g) − g which
is smaller than IO(g) = min {W, y∗O − g}. If g1 > 0, for any g ≤ g1, IL(g) = y∗1 − g < W
for any g ≤ g1 and IL(g) = y∗1 − g < y∗O − g for any g ≤ g1 (since y∗O > y∗1). This implies
IL(g) < IO(g) = min {W, y∗O − g} for any g ≤ g1.
Proof of Proposition 4
A) q = 2, . . . n− 1
To support the optimal stock of the public good as the outcome of a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, employ the following strategy configuration:
1. whenever a member is recognized, he proposes a public policy x, that entails a level
of investment equal to I∗O(g) and an even share of W − I∗O(g) as private transfer to all
committee members; everyone votes in favor of x (i.e. the proposal is implemented);
2. if a member j is recognized and deviates by proposing y 6= x, every i 6= j votes against
the proposal; from the following period on, whenever j is the proposer, every i 6= j
votes against any proposal, and whenever i 6= j is the proposer, he proposes to divide
W equally among all members but j as private transfers; every i 6= j votes for this
proposal (i.e. a punishment is carried on in all future periods in which the deviator is
the proposer; when the deviator is the proposer, the status quo is implemented);
3. if a member k deviates by voting contrary to the strategies above or if member k devi-
ates from the prescribed proposal in the punishment phase, implement the punishment
in strategy 2 with k replacing j;
We first show that the proposer has no profitable deviation from the equilibrium strategy
on the equilibrium path. The proposer’s payoff if she follows the equilibrium strategy is:{
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) if g < gO
W−(y∗O−g)
n
+ u(y∗O) + δVEQ(y
∗
O) if g > gO
where:
VEQ(y
∗
O) =
W
n
+ u(y∗O) + δVEQ(y
∗
O)
=⇒ VEQ(y∗O) =
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
]
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According to the proposed equilibrium voting strategies, whenever the proposal is dif-
ferent from the equilibrium one, a punishment will be carried out in every future period in
which the proposer is not the deviator and the status quo will be implemented in all the other
periods. Thus, all deviations are payoff equivalent. The proposer’s payoff if she deviates is:
W
n
+ u(g) + δVDEV (g) ∀g
where:
VDEV (g) =
n− 1
n
(u(g) + δVDEV (g)) +
1
n
(
W
n
+ u(g) + δVDEV (g)
)
=⇒ VDEV (g) = 1
1− δ
[
W
n2
+ u(g)
]
<
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
To check that the proposer’s strategy is an equilibrium it is sufficient to check that the
proposer has no profitable deviation. Notice that the expected payoff from a deviation is
lower than the payoff that would derive from implementing the status quo for the current
and all future periods. We can, thus, check that the expected payoff from the equilibrium
strategy is higher than the payoff from implementing the status quo forever. We have three
cases, depending on what region of the state space we are in:
Case 1: g ∈ [gO, y∗O) In this case we have:
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+ u(y∗O) + δVEQ(y
∗
O) ≥
W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒ W − (y
∗
O − g)
n
+ u(y∗O) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
]
≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒
[
u(y∗O)− u(g)
(y∗O − g)
]
≥ 1− δ
n
⇐⇒ 1
(y∗O − g)
∫ y∗O
g
u′(x)dx ≥ 1− δ
n
The inequality above holds for any δ ∈ [0, 1], To see this note that by concavity of u(·) and
the optimality condition in the efficient solution we have u′(x) > 1−δ
n
for any x < y∗O.
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Case 2: g ∈ [0, gO) & (g +W ) > gO : In this case we have:
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
where:
VEQ(g+W ) =
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+u(y∗O)+δVEQ(y
∗
O) =
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+u(y∗O)+
δ
1− δ
(
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
)
And therefore the inequality we want to check becomes:
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒ u(g +W ) + δ
(
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+ u(y∗O) +
δ
1− δ
(
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
))
≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
(
W
n
+ u(g)
)
⇐⇒ u(g +W ) + δu(y
∗
O)
(1− δ) −
u(g)
(1− δ) ≥
W
n
+ δ
y∗O
n
− δ g
n
Using the fact that u(g+W ) ≥ u(g) + u′(y∗O)W = u(g) + (1−δ)n W we have a lower bound
on the LHS and we can plug it in to have:
⇐⇒ u(g) + (1− δ)W
n
+
δu(y∗O)
(1− δ) −
u(g)
(1− δ) ≥
W
n
+ δ
y∗O
n
− δ g
n
⇐⇒ δ
(1− δ) [u(y
∗
O)− u(g)] ≥ δ
W + y∗O − g
n
⇐⇒ [u(y∗O)− u(g)] ≥ (1− δ)
W + y∗O − g
n
The inequality above holds for δ ≥ δ ∈ [0, 1].
We can find a lower bound on δ using the actual VDEV (g) rather than the expression
we used above (given by the expected utility of implementing the status quo for any period
following a deviation which is greater than VDEV (g) for any g). In this case, the inequality
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we want to prove is:
u(g +W ) +
δ [W − (y∗O − g)]
n
+ δu(y∗O) +
δ2
1− δ
(
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
)
≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n2
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒ u(g +W ) + δu(y
∗
O)
(1− δ) −
u(g)
(1− δ) ≥
(1− 2δ)n+ δ
(1− δ)n
W
n
+ δ
y∗O
n
− δ g
n
Using the fact that u(g+W ) ≥ u(g) + u′(y∗O)W = u(g) + (1−δ)n W we have a lower bound
on the LHS and we can plug it in to have:
⇐⇒ u(g) + (1− δ)W
n
+
δu(y∗O)
(1− δ) −
u(g)
(1− δ) ≥
(1− 2δ)n+ δ
(1− δ)n
W
n
+ δ
y∗O
n
− δ g
n
⇐⇒ δ
(1− δ) [u(y
∗
O)− u(g)] ≥
(1− δn)δ
(1− δ)n
W
n
+ δ
y∗O
n
− δ g
n
⇐⇒ [u(y∗O)− u(g)] ≥
(1− δn)
n
W
n
+ (1− δ)y
∗
O − g
n
The inequality above holds for δ ≥ δ ∈ [0, 1]. To see this notice that the LHS is always
positive while the RHS is non-positive as long as δ ≥ W (2n+1)−n.
W (3n+1)−n ∈ (0, 1) (because n > 1 and
W > 0 and in this region g ∈ (y∗O − 2W, y∗O −W )) .).
Case 3: g ∈ [0, gO) & (g+W ) < gO In this case we want to prove the following inequality:
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
where VEQ(g +W ) = u(g + 2W ) + δVEQ(g + 2W ).
Note that, since u′(x) > 1−δ
n
for any x < y∗O., we have u(g + x) > u(g) +
(1−δ)
n
x if
(g+ x) < y∗O. Using this inequality we have a lower bound on the RHS and it is sufficient to
prove that:
u(g) +
(1− δ)
n
W + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+ u(g) + δVDEV (g)
⇐⇒ VEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
Note that V ′EQ(x) > 1/n for any x < y
∗
O (as it is clear from the equation for VEQ(y
∗
O) and
the condition for optimality in the efficient solution) and, thus, VEQ(g + x) > VEQ(g) +
1
n
x.
This gives us a lower bound on VEQ(g+ 2W ) (> VEQ(g+W ) +
W
n
) that we can use to get a
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lower bound onVEQ(g +W ) :
VEQ(g +W ) = u(g + 2W ) + δVEQ(g + 2W )
VEQ(g +W ) >
1
1− δu(g + 2W ) +
δ
1− δ
W
n
>
1
1− δu(g) + 2
W
n
+
δ
1− δ
W
n
It is therefore sufficient to show that:
1
1− δu(g) + 2
W
n
+
δ
1− δ
W
n
≥ W
n
+
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒
(
2− δ
1− δ
)
≥
(
2− δ
1− δ
)
This inequality holds for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
Next, we need to prove that there is no profitable deviation from the prescribed voting
strategy on the equilibrium path (i.e. that the expected utility from voting “yes” to an equi-
librium proposal is weakly higher than the expected utility from voting “no”). A unilateral
deviation in the voting stage does not change the outcome (i.e. the efficient proposal will be
implemented) and the only difference in the two expected utilities (voting “yes” vs. voting
“no”) is in the continuation values, VEQ(g) and VDEV (g), which are the same as the ones
specified for the proposer (since the punishment takes the same form). We have three cases:
Case 1: g ∈ [gO, y∗O)
y∗O − g
n
+ u(y∗O) + δVEQ(y
∗
O) ≥
y∗O − g
n
+ u(y∗O) + δVDEV (y
∗
O)
VEQ(y
∗
O) ≥ VDEV (y∗O)
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
]
≥ 1
1− δ
[
W
n2
+ u(y∗O)
]
which clearly holds for any δ.
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Case 2: g ∈ [0, gO) & (g +W ) > gO :
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ u(g +W ) + δVDEV (g +W )
VEQ(g +W ) ≥ VDEV (g +W )
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+ u(y∗O) +
δ
1− δ
(
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
)
≥ 1
1− δ
[
W
n2
+ u(g +W )
]
1
1− δ [u(y
∗
O)− u(g +W )] ≥
1
1− δ
[
W (1− n)
n2
]
+
y∗O
n
− g
n
Notice that u(y∗O) ≥ u(g + W ) + u′(y∗O)(y∗O − g −W ) = u(g + W ) + 1−δn (y∗O − g −W ).
This gives us a lower bound on the LHS, y∗O/n − g/n −W/n. Therefore we can check the
following inequality:
⇐⇒ y
∗
O
n
− g
n
− W
n
≥ 1
1− δ
[
W (1− n)
n2
]
+
y∗O
n
− g
n
⇐⇒ −W
n
≥ 1
1− δ
[
W (1− n)
n2
]
⇐⇒ δ ≥ 1
n
Case 3: g ∈ [0, gO) & (g +W ) < gO
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ u(g +W ) + δVDEV (g +W )
VEQ(g +W ) ≥ VDEV (g +W )
VEQ(g +W ) ≥ 1
1− δ
[
W
n2
+ u(g +W )
]
As noted above, VEQ(g + W ) >
1
1−δu(g + 2W ) +
δ
1−δ
W
n
. This means that we can prove
the following inequality instead:
1
1− δu(g + 2W ) +
δ
1− δ
W
n
≥ 1
1− δ
[
W
n2
+ u(g +W )
]
1
1− δ [u(g + 2W )− u(g +W )] ≥
1
1− δ
[
W
n2
− δW
n
]
u(g + 2W )− u(g +W ) ≥ W
n2
− δW
n
For δ ≥ 1/n, the RHS is negative, while the LHS is always positive, which gives the
desired result.
Next, we need to prove that there is no profitable deviation from the prescribed voting
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strategy in the punishment phase (i.e. that the expected utility from voting “yes” to the
punishment proposal is weakly higher than the expected utility from voting “no”):
W
n− 1 + u(g) +
1
1− δ
[
W
n− 1 + u(g)
]
≥ W
n− 1 + u(g) +
1
1− δ
[
W
n2
+ u(g)
]
It is clear that the above inequality holds for any δ ∈ [0, 1] .
Finally, we need to prove that there is no profitable deviation from the prescribed proposal
strategy in the punishment phase. Any deviation will bring to rejection of the proposal and,
thus, implementation of the status quo. This means that a proposer different than the
deviator will stick to the punishment proposal as long as:
W
n− 1 + u(g) +
1
1− δ
[
W
n− 1 + u(g)
]
≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
1
1− δ
[
W
n2
+ u(g)
]
which clearly holds for any δ ∈ [0, 1] and we’re done.
B) q = n
In this case, following a deviation, the status quo will be implemented every period. This is
because - in the punishment phase - the deviator never accepts a proposals with an harsher
punishment and his vote is needed to pass any proposal. To support the optimal stock of
the public good as the outcome of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, employ the following
strategy configuration:
1. whenever a member is recognized, he proposes a public policy x, that entails a level
of investment equal to I∗O(g) and an even share of W − I∗O(g) as private transfer to all
committee members;
2. if a member j is recognized and deviates by proposing y 6= x, all future proposers
implement the status quo policy.
We first show that the proposer has no profitable deviation from the equilibrium strategy
on the equilibrium path. The proposer’s payoff if she follows the equilibrium strategy is:{
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) if g < gO
W−(y∗O−g)
n
+ u(y∗O) + δVEQ(y
∗
O) if g > gO
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where:
VEQ(y
∗
O) =
W
n
+ u(y∗O) + δVEQ(y
∗
O)
=⇒ VEQ(y∗O) =
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
]
According to the proposed equilibrium voting strategies, whenever the proposal is dif-
ferent from the equilibrium one, a punishment will be carried out in every future period in
which the proposer is not the deviator and the status quo will be implemented in all the other
periods. Thus, all deviations are payoff equivalent. The proposer’s payoff if she deviates is:
W
n
+ u(g) + δVDEV (g) ∀g
where:
VDEV (g) =
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
The expected payoff from a deviation is the payoff from implementing the status quo for
the current and all future periods. To check that the proposer’s strategy is an equilibrium it
is sufficient to check that the proposer has no profitable deviation. As before, we have three
cases, depending on what region of the state space we are in:
Case 1: g ∈ [gO, y∗O) In this case we have:
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+ u(y∗O) + δVEQ(y
∗
O) ≥
W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒ W − (y
∗
O − g)
n
+ u(y∗O) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
]
≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒
[
u(y∗O)− u(g)
(y∗O − g)
]
≥ 1− δ
n
⇐⇒ 1
(y∗O − g)
∫ y∗O
g
u′(x)dx ≥ 1− δ
n
The inequality above holds for any δ ∈ [0, 1], To see this note that by concavity of u(·) and
the optimality condition in the efficient solution we have u′(x) > 1−δ
n
for any x < y∗O.
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Case 2: g ∈ [0, gO) & (g +W ) > gO : In this case we have:
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
where:
VEQ(g+W ) =
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+u(y∗O)+δVEQ(y
∗
O) =
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+u(y∗O)+
δ
1− δ
(
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
)
And therefore the inequality we want to check becomes:
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒ u(g +W ) + δ
(
W − (y∗O − g)
n
+ u(y∗O) +
δ
1− δ
(
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
))
≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
(
W
n
+ u(g)
)
⇐⇒ u(g +W ) + δu(y
∗
O)
(1− δ) −
u(g)
(1− δ) ≥
W
n
+ δ
y∗O
n
− δ g
n
Using the fact that u(g+W ) ≥ u(g) + u′(y∗O)W = u(g) + (1−δ)n W we have a lower bound
on the LHS and we can plug it in to have:
⇐⇒ u(g) + (1− δ)W
n
+
δu(y∗O)
(1− δ) −
u(g)
(1− δ) ≥
W
n
+ δ
y∗O
n
− δ g
n
⇐⇒ δ
(1− δ) [u(y
∗
O)− u(g)] ≥ δ
W + y∗O − g
n
⇐⇒ [u(y∗O)− u(g)] ≥ (1− δ)
W + y∗O − g
n
The inequality above holds for δ ≥ δ ∈ [0, 1]. To see this notice that the LHS is strictly
positive while the RHS converges to zero as δ goes to 1.
Case 3: g ∈ [0, gO) & (g+W ) < gO In this case we want to prove the following inequality:
u(g +W ) + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+ u(g) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
where VEQ(g +W ) = u(g + 2W ) + δVEQ(g + 2W ).
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Note that, since u′(x) > 1−δ
n
for any x < y∗O., we have u(g + x) > u(g) +
(1−δ)
n
x if
(g+ x) < y∗O. Using this inequality we have a lower bound on the RHS and it is sufficient to
prove that:
u(g) +
(1− δ)
n
W + δVEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+ u(g) + δVDEV (g)
⇐⇒ VEQ(g +W ) ≥ W
n
+
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
Note that V ′EQ(x) > 1/n for any x < y
∗
O (as it is clear from the equation for VEQ(y
∗
O) and
the condition for optimality in the efficient solution) and, thus, VEQ(g + x) > VEQ(g) +
1
n
x.
This gives us a lower bound on VEQ(g+ 2W ) (> VEQ(g+W ) +
W
n
) that we can use to get a
lower bound onVEQ(g +W ) :
VEQ(g +W ) = u(g + 2W ) + δVEQ(g + 2W )
VEQ(g +W ) >
1
1− δu(g + 2W ) +
δ
1− δ
W
n
>
1
1− δu(g) + 2
W
n
+
δ
1− δ
W
n
It is therefore sufficient to show that:
1
1− δu(g) + 2
W
n
+
δ
1− δ
W
n
≥ W
n
+
1
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(g)
]
⇐⇒
(
2− δ
1− δ
)
≥
(
2− δ
1− δ
)
This inequality holds for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
Next, we need to prove that there is no profitable deviation from the prescribed voting
strategy on the equilibrium path (i.e. that the expected utility from voting “yes” to an
equilibrium proposal is weakly higher than the expected utility from voting “no”). If q = n,
voting “no” to an efficient proposal leads to the implementation of the status quo in the
current period and all following periods. This means that the comparison between the two
expected utilities (from the equilibrium strategy and from a deviation) is exactly the same
as for the proposer and the result showed above holds.
Next, we need to prove that there is no profitable deviation from the prescribed voting
strategy in the punishment phase (i.e. that the expected utility from voting “yes” to the
punishment proposal is weakly higher than the expected utility from voting “no”). In this
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case the punishment proposal is the same as the status quo and therefore the expected utility
from voting “yes” and “no” are the same. Finally, we need to prove that there is no profitable
deviation from the prescribed proposal strategy in the punishment phase. Any deviation will
bring to rejection of the proposal and, thus, implementation of the status quo. This means
that a proposer is indifferent between the punishment proposal and any deviation and we’re
done. 
C) q = 1
When q = 1 the proposer does not need the approval of any other member to implement a
public policy. To support the optimal stock of the public good as the outcome of a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium, employ the following strategy configuration:
1. whenever a member is recognized, he proposes a public policy x, that entails a level
of investment equal to I∗O(g) and an even share of W − I∗O(g) as private transfer to all
committee members;
2. if a member j is recognized and deviates by proposing y 6= x, all future proposers
implement the Markov perfect equilibrium policy, i.e. the policy that maximizes the
individual problem, i.e. I∗L(q = 1) and W − I∗L to the proposer as private transfer.
Denote y∗L(q = 1) as y
∗
D. The gains from deviation are greater the closer g is to y
∗
O .
Therefore, we will check whether the proposer has an incentive to deviate when g ∈ [g, y∗O],
or whether:
W − (y∗O − g) + u(y∗O) + δVEQ(y∗O) ≥ W − (y∗D − g) + u(y∗D) + δVDEV (y∗D)
where VEQ(y
∗
O) is defined as before and VDEV (y
∗
D) =
1
1−δ
[
W
n
+ u(y∗D)
]
. Plugging in
VEQ(y
∗
O) and VDEV (y
∗
D) we have:
W − (y∗O − g) + u(y∗O) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(y∗O)
]
≥ W − (y∗D − g) + u(y∗D) +
δ
1− δ
[
W
n
+ u(y∗D)
]
u(y∗O)− u(y∗D) ≥ (1− δ)(y∗O − y∗D)
There is δ such that ∀δ > δ the inequality above holds. To see this note that the LHS
is greater than zero (since u(·) is increasing and y∗O > y∗D) and that as δ approaches 1, the
RHS approaches zero. 
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Appendix B - Additional Tables
Round Dictatorship (D) Simple Majority (M) Unanimity (U)
n Avg Mdn SE n Avg Mdn SE n Avg Mdn SE
1 60 14.00 18.75 0.91 60 16.39 20.00 0.59 60 18.50 20.00 0.66
2 57 22.50 26.25 2.04 48 27.12 30.67 1.17 54 33.17 40.00 1.43
3 51 26.08 28.75 2.91 30 32.2 36.33 1.57 36 41.24 40.00 1.92
4 45 23.84 15.00 3.83 18 36.3 38.50 3.05 27 46.76 45.00 2.40
5 33 19.92 15.25 3.81 15 39.45 40.75 4.78 21 50.64 47.50 2.78
6 24 25.48 23.00 4.67 12 38.67 39.25 5.87 15 54.90 52.50 4.60
7 18 25.92 16.25 6.20 6 42.17 29.00 13.80 15 57.32 55.00 5.73
8 12 22.15 20.00 6.98 6 46.72 35.17 13.11 12 57.92 60.00 4.52
9 12 21.21 15.00 6.93 6 42.77 32.67 15.65 6 58.54 63.13 6.82
10 12 22.15 12.50 7.34 3 42.56 30.33 18.72 6 58.75 63.13 6.88
Table 8: Summary statistics of public good stocks per round, all treatments.
Round D vs. U M vs. U D vs. M
1 0.0001 0.0184 0.0290
2 0.0000 0.0013 0.0500
3 0.0002 0.0005 0.0332
4 0.0000 0.0096 0.0126
5 0.0000 0.0488 0.0023
6 0.0001 0.0370 0.0850
7 0.0009 0.3199 0.2882
8 0.0008 0.4236 0.1085
9 0.0037 0.3723 0.1106
10 0.0059 0.4359 0.1610
Table 9: P-values of t-tests on the equality of public good stock averages.
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Appendix C [Not For Publication]
Experiment Instructions and Sample Screenshot
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE M TREATMENT
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. During the experiment we
require your complete, undistracted attention and ask that you follow instructions carefully.
Please turn off your cell phones. Do not open other applications on your computer, chat
with other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as reading books, doing
homework, etc. You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Different participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. It is important that you
not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiments.
Following the instructions, there will be a practice session and a short comprehension
quiz. All questions on the quiz must be answered correctly before continuing to the paid
session. At the end you will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others
how much you earned. Your earnings are denominated in FRANCS which will be converted
to dollars at the rate of 75 FRANCS to a DOLLAR.
This is an experiment in committee decision making. The experiment will take place over
a sequence of 10 matches. We begin the match by dividing you into THREE committees
of five members each. Each of you is assigned to exactly one of these committees. In each
match your committee will make budget decisions by simple majority over a sequence of
several rounds.
A1 + A2 + A3 +A4 +A5 +P=80
[SHOW SLIDE]
In each round your committee has a budget of 80 francs. Your committee must decide
how to divide this budget into six categories, in integer amounts: The first five categories
are the private allocations and they always have to be greater than or equal to 0. The sixth
category is for investment in a project and it can be either positive, zero, or negative If your
committees budget decision is (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, P ), then A1 francs go directly to member
1s earnings, A2 to member 2, and A3 to member 3 and so on. The project investment
produces earnings for all committee members in the following way.
[SHOW SLIDE]
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The project earnings in a round depend on the size of the project at the end of that
round. Specifically, each committee member earns an amount in francs proportional to the
square root of the size of the project at the end of the round (precisely equal to 4*sqrt(project
size) ). During the experiment, there will be a graph on the screen that shows exactly how
project earnings will depend on project size. For example, if the size of the project at the end
of the round equals 9, then each member earns exactly 4*sqrt(9) or 12 additional francs in
that round. If the size is equal to 25, each member earns exactly 4*sqrt(25) or 20 additional
francs in that round. In your display, earnings are always rounded to two decimal places.
So, for example if the project size at the end of a round equals 5, each member earns 8.94
francs from the project in that round.
The second important fact about the project is that it is durable. That is, project
investment in a round increases or decreases the size not just for that round, but also for all
future rounds. The size of your committees project starts at 0 in the first round of the match.
At the end of the first round it is equal to your committees project investment decision in
that round. This amount gets carried over to the second round. Whenever the size of the
project is greater than 0, you can propose a negative project investment. However, in this
case, the proposed negative investment cannot exceed the size of the project at the beginning
of the round (in other words, the project size at the end of the round can never be negative).
At the end of the second round, the size of the project is equal to the combined amount
invested in rounds 1 and 2, and so forth. So, every round the project investment changes
the size of the project for the current and all future rounds of that match.
The total number of rounds in a match will depend on the rolling of a fair 8-sided die.
When the first round ends, we roll it to decide whether to move on to the second round. If
the die comes up a 1 or a 2 we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over. Otherwise,
we continue to the next round. We continue to more rounds, until a 1 or a 2 is rolled at
the end of a round and the match ends. At the end of each round your earnings for that
round are computed by adding the project earnings to your private allocation. For example,
if your private allocation is 2 and the end-of-round project size is 9, then your earnings for
that round equal 2 + 4*sqrt(9) = 2+4*3 = 14 Your earnings for the match equal the sum
of the earnings in all rounds of that match.
After the first match ends, we move to match 2. In this new match, you are reshuﬄed
randomly into three new committees of five members each. The project size in your new
committee again starts out at 0. The match then proceeds the same way as match 1. After
match 10, the experiment is over. Your total earnings for the experiment are the sum of
your earnings over all rounds and all matches.
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We will now go through one practice match very slowly. During the practice match,
please do not hit any keys until I tell you, and when you are prompted by the computer to
enter information, please wait for me to tell you exactly what to enter. You are not paid for
this practice match.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says BP2. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait
for further instructions. You now see the first screen of the experiment on your computer.
It should look similar to this screen.
[SHOW SLIDE]
At the top left of the screen, you see your subject ID. You have been assigned by the
computer to a committee of five subjects, and assigned a committee member number: 1,
2, 3, 4 or 5. This committee assignment and your member number stays the same for all
rounds of this match, but will change across matches. It is very important that you take
careful note of your committee member number. Notice that the initial size of the project
in your committee is 0.
Your committee decides on a budget for this round by the following voting procedure.
First, every member is asked to type in a provisional budget proposal, consisting of six
integers, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and P, which add up to 80. A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 have to
be greater than or equal to 0, while P has to be greater than or equal to (size of the project
at the beginning of the round).
As a visual aid, there is a graph on the left that shows exactly how project earnings will
depend on project size. The current size of the project is marked with a large dot. If your
committee decides to invest nothing this period, then this will be the size that determines
your project earnings at the end of the round. You can use your mouse to move the curser
along the curve to figure out what your earnings will be for different levels of investment.
Also, if you type in a budget amount in the Project box, the computer will compute and
display the corresponding project earnings for you just below the box. Take a minute to
practice using your curser to move along the curve, and typing in different possible investment
levels for the Project. But do not hit the confirm button yet.
At this time, go ahead and type in any provisional proposal you wish and hit the confirm
button. You are not paid for this practice match so it does not matter what you enter.
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[SHOW SLIDE]
After everyone in your committee has submitted a provisional budget proposal, your
screen should now look similar to this one. The computer has randomly selected one of the
provisional budget proposal submitted by the members of your committee to be the Round
One Proposed Budget in your committee. In the top-right of your screen you are shown this
proposed budget as well as which committee member made this proposal.
A vote is now taken between the Proposed Budget and an alternative, called the Backup
Budget, which has zero investment in the project. The backup budget is always (16,16,16,16,16,0)
in every round for every committee. On your screen you can see a table listing the proposed
budget and the backup budget, and how the allocation is distributed under each. The de-
cision between budgets is made by majority rule. Therefore the proposed budget passes if
and only if it receives two votes. Otherwise, it fails, and the backup budget is implemented.
To vote to accept the Proposed Budget, click on the yes button; to reject it, click on the no
button. Please go ahead and vote now.
The two budgets are displayed in a table, and the budget that was implemented this
round is highlighted in green. Below the table are displayed your earnings for the round,
given the outcome. In this example, the provisional budget passed, and my earnings for the
round were x. Note that these numbers are totally random and they are not suggestive of
what we expect to occur during the experiment. This marks the end of the round. The table
with columns in the bottom of your screen is the History panel and summarizes all of this
important information.
We now roll an eight-sided die to decide whether to move on to round 2. If the die comes
up a 1 or a 2, we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over. If the die comes up 3
through 8, we continue to a second round of the match. [Roll die and do second round unless
it comes up a 1 or 2. Next say the die roll was X, so we will continue to the next round. If
X=(1 or 2) say if this was a real match, there would be no second round. That would be the
end of the match. However, we want to go through one more practice round to make sure
you are familiar with the computer interface.]
[SHOW SLIDE]
In this second round, you keep the same committee member number as in the first round,
and the members of your committee all stay the same. Notice that the project investment
from round 1 carries over, so the round 2 beginning project size equals the project size at the
end of round 1. In this second round please follow the same instructions of the first round.
You can go ahead now.
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Since this is a practice match, we will not roll a die after the second round, and the
practice match will end. During the paid matches, each match will continue until the die
comes up a 1 or a 2.
[SHOW SUMMARY SLIDE]
Now we are ready for the comprehension quiz. Everyone must answer all the questions
correctly before we go to the paid matches. The quiz has three pages. You must answer
all the questions on Page 1 of the quiz to proceed to Page 2, and you must answer all the
questions on Page 2 of the quiz to proceed to Page 3. If you answer any of the questions
on a page incorrectly, you will be asked to try again. Please raise your hand if you have
any questions during the quiz, and we will come to your desk and answer your question in
private.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE U TREATMENT
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. During the experiment we
require your complete, undistracted attention and ask that you follow instructions carefully.
Please turn off your cell phones. Do not open other applications on your computer, chat
with other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as reading books, doing
homework, etc. You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Different participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. It is important that you
not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiments.
Following the instructions, there will be a practice session and a short comprehension
quiz. All questions on the quiz must be answered correctly before continuing to the paid
session. At the end you will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others
how much you earned. Your earnings are denominated in FRANCS which will be converted
to dollars at the rate of 75 FRANCS to a DOLLAR.
This is an experiment in committee decision making. The experiment will take place over
a sequence of 10 matches. We begin the match by dividing you into THREE committees
of five members each. Each of you is assigned to exactly one of these committees. In each
match your committee will make budget decisions by unanimity over a sequence of several
rounds.
A1 + A2 + A3 +A4 +A5 +P=80
[SHOW SLIDE]
In each round your committee has a budget of 80 francs. Your committee must decide
how to divide this budget into six categories, in integer amounts: The first five categories
are the private allocations and they always have to be greater than or equal to 0. The sixth
category is for investment in a project and it can be either positive, zero, or negative If your
committees budget decision is (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, P ), then A1 francs go directly to member
1s earnings, A2 to member 2, and A3 to member 3 and so on. The project investment
produces earnings for all committee members in the following way.
[SHOW SLIDE]
The project earnings in a round depend on the size of the project at the end of that
round. Specifically, each committee member earns an amount in francs proportional to the
square root of the size of the project at the end of the round (precisely equal to 4*sqrt(project
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size) ). During the experiment, there will be a graph on the screen that shows exactly how
project earnings will depend on project size. For example, if the size of the project at the end
of the round equals 9, then each member earns exactly 4*sqrt(9) or 12 additional francs in
that round. If the size is equal to 25, each member earns exactly 4*sqrt(25) or 20 additional
francs in that round. In your display, earnings are always rounded to two decimal places.
So, for example if the project size at the end of a round equals 5, each member earns 8.94
francs from the project in that round.
The second important fact about the project is that it is durable. That is, project
investment in a round increases or decreases the size not just for that round, but also for all
future rounds. The size of your committees project starts at 0 in the first round of the match.
At the end of the first round it is equal to your committees project investment decision in
that round. This amount gets carried over to the second round. Whenever the size of the
project is greater than 0, you can propose a negative project investment. However, in this
case, the proposed negative investment cannot exceed the size of the project at the beginning
of the round (in other words, the project size at the end of the round can never be negative).
At the end of the second round, the size of the project is equal to the combined amount
invested in rounds 1 and 2, and so forth. So, every round the project investment changes
the size of the project for the current and all future rounds of that match.
The total number of rounds in a match will depend on the rolling of a fair 8-sided die.
When the first round ends, we roll it to decide whether to move on to the second round. If
the die comes up a 1 or a 2 we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over. Otherwise,
we continue to the next round. We continue to more rounds, until a 1 or a 2 is rolled at
the end of a round and the match ends. At the end of each round your earnings for that
round are computed by adding the project earnings to your private allocation. For example,
if your private allocation is 2 and the end-of-round project size is 9, then your earnings for
that round equal 2 + 4*sqrt(9) = 2+4*3 = 14 Your earnings for the match equal the sum
of the earnings in all rounds of that match.
After the first match ends, we move to match 2. In this new match, you are reshuﬄed
randomly into three new committees of five members each. The project size in your new
committee again starts out at 0. The match then proceeds the same way as match 1. After
match 10, the experiment is over. Your total earnings for the experiment are the sum of
your earnings over all rounds and all matches.
We will now go through one practice match very slowly. During the practice match,
please do not hit any keys until I tell you, and when you are prompted by the computer to
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enter information, please wait for me to tell you exactly what to enter. You are not paid for
this practice match.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says BP2. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait
for further instructions. You now see the first screen of the experiment on your computer.
It should look similar to this screen.
[SHOW SLIDE]
At the top left of the screen, you see your subject ID. You have been assigned by the
computer to a committee of five subjects, and assigned a committee member number: 1,
2, 3, 4 or 5. This committee assignment and your member number stays the same for all
rounds of this match, but will change across matches. It is very important that you take
careful note of your committee member number. Notice that the initial size of the project
in your committee is 0.
Your committee decides on a budget for this round by the following voting procedure.
First, every member is asked to type in a provisional budget proposal, consisting of six
integers, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and P, which add up to 80. A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 have to
be greater than or equal to 0, while P has to be greater than or equal to (size of the project
at the beginning of the round).
As a visual aid, there is a graph on the left that shows exactly how project earnings will
depend on project size. The current size of the project is marked with a large dot. If your
committee decides to invest nothing this period, then this will be the size that determines
your project earnings at the end of the round. You can use your mouse to move the curser
along the curve to figure out what your earnings will be for different levels of investment.
Also, if you type in a budget amount in the Project box, the computer will compute and
display the corresponding project earnings for you just below the box. Take a minute to
practice using your curser to move along the curve, and typing in different possible investment
levels for the Project. But do not hit the confirm button yet.
At this time, go ahead and type in any provisional proposal you wish and hit the confirm
button. You are not paid for this practice match so it does not matter what you enter.
[SHOW SLIDE]
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After everyone in your committee has submitted a provisional budget proposal, your
screen should now look similar to this one. The computer has randomly selected one of the
provisional budget proposal submitted by the members of your committee to be the Round
One Proposed Budget in your committee. In the top-right of your screen you are shown this
proposed budget as well as which committee member made this proposal.
A vote is now taken between the Proposed Budget and an alternative, called the Backup
Budget, which has zero investment in the project. The backup budget is always (16,16,16,16,16,0)
in every round for every committee. On your screen you can see a table listing the proposed
budget and the backup budget, and how the allocation is distributed under each. The de-
cision between budgets is made by unanimity rule. Therefore the proposed budget passes if
and only if it receives five votes. Otherwise, it fails, and the backup budget is implemented.
To vote to accept the Proposed Budget, click on the yes button; to reject it, click on the no
button. Please go ahead and vote now.
The two budgets are displayed in a table, and the budget that was implemented this
round is highlighted in green. Below the table are displayed your earnings for the round,
given the outcome. In this example, the provisional budget passed, and my earnings for the
round were x. Note that these numbers are totally random and they are not suggestive of
what we expect to occur during the experiment. This marks the end of the round. The table
with columns in the bottom of your screen is the History panel and summarizes all of this
important information.
We now roll an eight-sided die to decide whether to move on to round 2. If the die comes
up a 1 or a 2, we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over. If the die comes up 3
through 8, we continue to a second round of the match. [Roll die and do second round unless
it comes up a 1 or 2. Next say the die roll was X, so we will continue to the next round. If
X=(1 or 2) say if this was a real match, there would be no second round. That would be the
end of the match. However, we want to go through one more practice round to make sure
you are familiar with the computer interface.]
[SHOW SLIDE]
In this second round, you keep the same committee member number as in the first round,
and the members of your committee all stay the same. Notice that the project investment
from round 1 carries over, so the round 2 beginning project size equals the project size at the
end of round 1. In this second round please follow the same instructions of the first round.
You can go ahead now.
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Since this is a practice match, we will not roll a die after the second round, and the
practice match will end. During the paid matches, each match will continue until the die
comes up a 1 or a 2.
[SHOW SUMMARY SLIDE]
Now we are ready for the comprehension quiz. Everyone must answer all the questions
correctly before we go to the paid matches. The quiz has three pages. You must answer
all the questions on Page 1 of the quiz to proceed to Page 2, and you must answer all the
questions on Page 2 of the quiz to proceed to Page 3. If you answer any of the questions
on a page incorrectly, you will be asked to try again. Please raise your hand if you have
any questions during the quiz, and we will come to your desk and answer your question in
private.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE D TREATMENT
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. During the experiment we
require your complete, undistracted attention and ask that you follow instructions carefully.
Please turn off your cell phones. Do not open other applications on your computer, chat
with other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as reading books, doing
homework, etc. You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Different participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. It is important that you
not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiments.
Following the instructions, there will be a practice session and a short comprehension
quiz. All questions on the quiz must be answered correctly before continuing to the paid
session. At the end you will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others
how much you earned. Your earnings are denominated in FRANCS which will be converted
to dollars at the rate of 75 FRANCS to a DOLLAR.
This is an experiment in committee decision making. The experiment will take place over
a sequence of 10 matches. We begin the match by dividing you into THREE committees
of five members each. Each of you is assigned to exactly one of these committees. In each
match your committee will make budget decisions over a sequence of several rounds.
A1 + A2 + A3 +A4 +A5 +P=80
[SHOW SLIDE]
In each round your committee has a budget of 80 francs. Your committee must decide
how to divide this budget into six categories, in integer amounts: The first five categories
are the private allocations and they always have to be greater than or equal to 0. The sixth
category is for investment in a project and it can be either positive, zero, or negative If your
committees budget decision is (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, P ), then A1 francs go directly to member
1s earnings, A2 to member 2, and A3 to member 3 and so on. The project investment
produces earnings for all committee members in the following way.
[SHOW SLIDE]
The project earnings in a round depend on the size of the project at the end of that
round. Specifically, each committee member earns an amount in francs proportional to the
square root of the size of the project at the end of the round (precisely equal to 4*sqrt(project
size) ). During the experiment, there will be a graph on the screen that shows exactly how
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project earnings will depend on project size. For example, if the size of the project at the end
of the round equals 9, then each member earns exactly 4*sqrt(9) or 12 additional francs in
that round. If the size is equal to 25, each member earns exactly 4*sqrt(25) or 20 additional
francs in that round. In your display, earnings are always rounded to two decimal places.
So, for example if the project size at the end of a round equals 5, each member earns 8.94
francs from the project in that round.
The second important fact about the project is that it is durable. That is, project
investment in a round increases or decreases the size not just for that round, but also for all
future rounds. The size of your committees project starts at 0 in the first round of the match.
At the end of the first round it is equal to your committees project investment decision in
that round. This amount gets carried over to the second round. Whenever the size of the
project is greater than 0, you can propose a negative project investment. However, in this
case, the proposed negative investment cannot exceed the size of the project at the beginning
of the round (in other words, the project size at the end of the round can never be negative).
At the end of the second round, the size of the project is equal to the combined amount
invested in rounds 1 and 2, and so forth. So, every round the project investment changes
the size of the project for the current and all future rounds of that match.
The total number of rounds in a match will depend on the rolling of a fair 8-sided die.
When the first round ends, we roll it to decide whether to move on to the second round. If
the die comes up a 1 or a 2 we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over. Otherwise,
we continue to the next round. We continue to more rounds, until a 1 or a 2 is rolled at
the end of a round and the match ends. At the end of each round your earnings for that
round are computed by adding the project earnings to your private allocation. For example,
if your private allocation is 2 and the end-of-round project size is 9, then your earnings for
that round equal 2 + 4*sqrt(9) = 2+4*3 = 14 Your earnings for the match equal the sum
of the earnings in all rounds of that match.
After the first match ends, we move to match 2. In this new match, you are reshuﬄed
randomly into three new committees of five members each. The project size in your new
committee again starts out at 0. The match then proceeds the same way as match 1. After
match 10, the experiment is over. Your total earnings for the experiment are the sum of
your earnings over all rounds and all matches.
We will now go through one practice match very slowly. During the practice match,
please do not hit any keys until I tell you, and when you are prompted by the computer to
enter information, please wait for me to tell you exactly what to enter. You are not paid for
this practice match.
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[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says BP2. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait
for further instructions. You now see the first screen of the experiment on your computer.
It should look similar to this screen.
[SHOW SLIDE]
At the top left of the screen, you see your subject ID. You have been assigned by the
computer to a committee of five subjects, and assigned a committee member number: 1,
2, 3, 4 or 5. This committee assignment and your member number stays the same for all
rounds of this match, but will change across matches. It is very important that you take
careful note of your committee member number. Notice that the initial size of the project
in your committee is 0.
Your committee decides on a budget for this round by the following voting procedure.
First, every member is asked to type in a provisional budget proposal, consisting of six
integers, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and P, which add up to 80. A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 have to
be greater than or equal to 0, while P has to be greater than or equal to (size of the project
at the beginning of the round).
As a visual aid, there is a graph on the left that shows exactly how project earnings will
depend on project size. The current size of the project is marked with a large dot. If your
committee decides to invest nothing this period, then this will be the size that determines
your project earnings at the end of the round. You can use your mouse to move the curser
along the curve to figure out what your earnings will be for different levels of investment.
Also, if you type in a budget amount in the Project box, the computer will compute and
display the corresponding project earnings for you just below the box. Take a minute to
practice using your curser to move along the curve, and typing in different possible investment
levels for the Project. But do not hit the confirm button yet.
At this time, go ahead and type in any provisional proposal you wish and hit the confirm
button. You are not paid for this practice match so it does not matter what you enter.
[SHOW SLIDE]
After everyone in your committee has submitted a provisional budget proposal, your
screen should now look similar to this one. The computer has randomly selected one of
the provisional budget proposals submitted by the members of your committee to be the
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Round One Selected Budget in your committee. In the top-right of your screen you are
shown this selected budget as well as which committee member made this proposal. The
budget proposal that was randomly selected is the one that will be the committee decision
in this round. Your earnings for the round are displayed below the table. In this example,
the selected budget was [x x x x x, x], proposed by committee member number x, and my
earnings for the round were x. Note that these numbers are totally random and they are
not suggestive of what we expect to occur during the experiment. This marks the end of
the round. The table with columns in the bottom of your screen is the History panel and
summarizes all of this important information.
We now roll an eight-sided die to decide whether to move on to round 2. If the die comes
up a 1 or a 2, we do not go on to round 2, and the match is over. If the die comes up 3
through 8, we continue to a second round of the match. [Roll die and do second round unless
it comes up a 1 or 2. Next say the die roll was X, so we will continue to the next round. If
X=(1 or 2) say if this was a real match, there would be no second round. That would be the
end of the match. However, we want to go through one more practice round to make sure
you are familiar with the computer interface.]
[SHOW SLIDE]
In this second round, you keep the same committee member number as in the first round,
and the members of your committee all stay the same. Notice that the project investment
from round 1 carries over, so the round 2 beginning project size equals the project size at the
end of round 1. In this second round please follow the same instructions of the first round.
You can go ahead now.
Since this is a practice match, we will not roll a die after the second round, and the
practice match will end. During the paid matches, each match will continue until the die
comes up a 1 or a 2.
[SHOW SUMMARY SLIDE]
Now we are ready for the comprehension quiz. Everyone must answer all the questions
correctly before we go to the paid matches. The quiz has three pages. You must answer
all the questions on Page 1 of the quiz to proceed to Page 2, and you must answer all the
questions on Page 2 of the quiz to proceed to Page 3. If you answer any of the questions
on a page incorrectly, you will be asked to try again. Please raise your hand if you have
any questions during the quiz, and we will come to your desk and answer your question in
private.
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SAMPLE COMPREHENSION QUIZ
Q: For a budget proposal, what do A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, and P have to add up to?
A. 20
B. 30
C. 70
D. 80
Q: Your Provisional Budget Proposal will always be selected as the Proposed Budget.
A. True
B. False. It will be the Proposed Budget only when you are chosen randomly by the computer
to be the Proposer, which will happen about 1/5 of the time.
Q: There are two rounds in each match.
A. True
B. False. There are ten rounds in each match.
C. False. The number of rounds in each match depends on the roll of the die.
Q: The level of the project at the beginning of the round is 10. What is the maximum
that you can allocate to private allocations (A1+A2+A3+A4+A5) in your Budget Proposal?
Remember that if the project size is greater than 0 you can propose a negative P and that
A1+A2+A3+A4+A5+P has always to be equal to 80.
A. 10
B. 80
C. 90
Q: The Backup Budget is the same in every round of a match.
A. True, it is always (16,16,16,16,16: 0).
B. False, it changes each round.
Q: Your committee member number stays the same throughout the experiment.
A. True
B. False. Your committee member number stays the same in every round of a match, but
may be reassigned for new matches.
Q: How many members are there in your committee?
A. 1
B. 2
C. 5
D. 4
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Q: The ending project size in round 2 of a match is carried over and becomes the beginning
project size in round 3 of that match.
A. True
B. False. Only 75 percent of the project size is carried over to the next round.
C. False
Q: You are reshuﬄed into a different committee for each round.
A. True
B. False. You are in the same committee for all rounds of a match.
Q: The committee decision is always the Proposed Budget.
A. True
B. False. The committee decision is the Proposed Budget or the Backup Budget depending
on whether everyone votes in favor of the Proposed Budget or not.
Q: Suppose the beginning project size is 9, the Proposed Budget in your committee is (5,11,15,10,12:
27), and the Proposed Budget receives three votes. What are your earnings for that period if
you are committee member 1?
A. 0
B. 17
C. 29
D. 27
E. 5
F. 24
G. Not enough information to answer.
Q: Suppose the beginning project size is 9, the Proposed Budget in your committee is (5,11,15,10,12:
27), and the Proposed Budget receives five votes. What are your earnings for that period if
you are committee member 1?
A. 0
B. 17
C. 29
D. 27
E. 5
F. 24
G. Not enough information to answer.
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Figure 6: U Treatment, Sample Screen for Proposal Stage
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Figure 7: U Treatment, Sample Screen for Voting Stage
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Figure 8: U Treatment, Sample Screen for Voting Outcome
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